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Abstract
Automatic security protocol analysis is currently feasible only for small protocols. Since larger protocols quite often are
composed of many small protocols, compositional analysis is an attractive, but non-trivial approach.
We have developed a framework for compositional analysis of a large class of security protocols. The framework is
intended to facilitate automatic as well as manual veriﬁcation of large structured security protocols. Our approach is to
verify properties of component protocols in a multi-protocol environment, then deduce properties about the composed
protocol. To reduce the complexity of multi-protocol veriﬁcation, we introduce a notion of protocol independence and
prove a number of theorems that enable analysis of independent component protocols in isolation.
To illustrate the applicability of our framework to real-worldprotocols,we study akey establishment sequence inWiMAX
consisting of three subprotocols. Except for a small amount of trivial reasoning, the analysis is done using automatic tools.
© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Security protocols are a crucial component of many contemporary applications. Their security is however
very difﬁcult to assess for humans, mainly due to the vast number of attack options available to an adversary.
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To deal with this complexity, a structured approach is needed. Starting from abstract protocols, formal methods
facilitate the systematic detection of attacks or the generation of a proof of correctness. Automating this process
in order to minimize the risk of human error is one of the major goals in security protocol analysis.
Automatic protocol veriﬁcation is, in general, a complex task even for short protocols. The time needed
for veriﬁcation of a protocol using modern methods employed by state of the art tools such as Scyther [11] or
AVISPA [4] is still exponential with respect to the number of messages. Consequently, automatic veriﬁcation
of large protocols is currently infeasible. In this paper, we attempt to narrow the gap between small, academic
protocols and large, industrial protocols by taking advantage of compositional veriﬁcation.
Large protocols are usually built from structured components. They typically consist of several (optional)
protocols composed in parallel, or a sequential composition of a key establishment protocol and a secure data
transfer protocol that uses the key. For instance, IPSec, SET, and WiMAX have all been designed with such
a principle in mind. A compositional approach to the design and analysis of security protocols is therefore
natural and expected to reduce the complexity of the analysis of the large protocol to the order of the com-
plexity of the analysis of the largest component. This could be achieved by ﬁrst verifying properties of the
components in isolation and then using the results to deduce properties of the composed protocol. However,
as no generic compositionality results are known, further assumptions are needed to facilitate this type of
reasoning.
We illustrate the non-triviality of protocol composition by means of the well-known Needham-Schroeder-
Lowe (NSL) public key authentication protocol [32,37]. In isolation, it satisﬁes even the strongest forms of
authentication, suchas agreement and synchronization [16].However,when sequentially composing this protocol
with itself (see the left drawing in Fig. 1), authentication is not preserved. The reason is that the initiator i may
successfully ﬁnish his run of the composed protocol, while the responder r possibly never executed the second
half of the protocol. This is because the second half of the initiator’s runmaymatch to the ﬁrst half of a different
run of the responder. This authentication problem is illustrated in Fig. 2. Here we see agent A executing the
initiator role i and agent B executing two different runs of the responder role r. The intruder links the messages
as indicated. Run A(i) and run B(r)2 will agree on the values of ni, and nr, but not on the values of ni′ and nr′,
since these last two values are not communicated between these two runs. In a similar way, it is clear that run
A(i) and run B(r)1 do not agree on the supposedly shared nonces.
This problem is solved in the right drawing in Fig. 1 by chaining the two protocols. A nonce from the ﬁrst
instance of NSL is repeated as payload in the second instance. In this way the two protocols become linked and
the chained protocol satisﬁes authentication. The authentication problem from Fig. 2 is now impossible.
Even though it is well known that the composition of secure protocols is in general not secure [2,13,25,
31] and compositionality has been recognized as one of the open challenges for security protocol analysis
Fig. 1. Repeated NSL protocol: incorrect and correct chaining.
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Fig. 2. Authentication problem in incorrectly chained NSL protocol.
[12,36], the vast majority of formalisms and tools for security protocols have only addressed single-protocol
(i.e. non-composed) analysis and veriﬁcation. Early work on identifying and addressing the problem includes
[38]. An initial attempt within the Strand Spaces model [42] has led to some theoretical results about com-
positionality. The Strand Spaces approach is similar to the one taken here in that both attempt to iden-
tify the abstract properties two protocols need to satisfy in order to be securely composable. However, this
work signiﬁcantly improves upon the Strand Spaces approach in terms of efﬁciency in verifying composed
protocols and by considering sequential composition, which was absent in the Strand Spaces model. One
of the recent signiﬁcant developments in compositional protocol analysis is Protocol Composition Logic
(PCL) [17,18]. It provides support for compositional reasoning, and has been applied in a number of case
studies, including the veriﬁcation of the TLS and IEEE 802.11i protocols [24] and contract signing protocols
[5]. While the PCL approach is quite general, it cannot, in contrast to the present approach, be easily auto-
mated.
In this paper, we develop a framework to verify security properties of protocols that are composed from
several smaller protocols. We prove several theorems concerning the deduction of properties of a sequential
composition of two protocols from properties these protocols have when running together in a multi-protocol
environment. With these theorems, we reduce the analysis of a sequential composition to the analysis of the
component protocols running together.
Analyzing several protocols in a multi-protocol environment is, in general, no easier than analyzing their
sequential composition. In order to make automatic analysis feasible, we introduce the notion of protocol set
independence, where ciphertexts, signatures, and message authentication tags originating in one protocol set
will never be accepted by the other protocol set and vice versa. This notion allows us to prove several theorems
regarding the deduction of properties of protocols running together in a multi-protocol environment from
properties these protocols have when running in isolation.
Verifying independence itself is non-trivial, therefore we need the notion of strong independence, where
the forms of ciphertexts, message authentication tags, and signatures in the two protocol sets are sufﬁciently
different to prevent confusion. Strong independence can be easily veriﬁed at the syntactical level, and implies
independence. We show that through common design strategies for security protocols in current use, strong
independence will be satisﬁed. Note that different protocols can use the same cryptographic keys and still be
both, independent and strongly independent.
The model we use is based on the operational semantics for security protocols deﬁned in [15]. In contrast
to other approaches, in which only singular protocols are considered, this model provides a semantics of
protocols in a multi-protocol setting. This makes it a good starting point for compositional veriﬁcation,
since, as indicated, the problem of proving correctness of a composed protocol can be translated into the
problem of proving correctness of the components in a multi-protocol setting comprising the components
themselves.
To show the applicability of our work, we perform a case study. We have chosen to focus on the IEEE
802.16 standard, also known as WiMAX. This standard speciﬁes the air interface of wireless access systems
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featuring a security sublayer intended to protect network operators from theft of service and provide conﬁ-
dentiality to subscribers. WiMAX features a security sublayer consisting of several subprotocols for authen-
tication, key management, and secure communication. This makes WiMAX well suited for an analysis in our
framework. Our veriﬁcation is completely tool-supported, except for some trivial reasoning and theorem appli-
cation.
1.1. Overview of the paper
We start off by giving a brief description of the security protocol model and security properties used in
Section 2. In Section 3, we develop a framework for compositional reasoning about security protocols, and
prove a number of compositionality theorems. We show how the developed theory can be applied in practice by
performing a case study on key management protocols in the security sublayer of WiMAX in Section 4. Related
work is discussed in Section 5, and we draw conclusions and discuss future work in Section 6.
2. Security protocols and their semantics
In this section we describe an existing formal framework for modeling security protocols, and extend it with
notions relevant for compositional reasoning.
We begin by giving a brief overview of the model in Section 2.1 before describing the full technical details in
Sections 2.2 and 2.3. The model presented here is based on the model deﬁned in [15]. Readers who are familiar
with the basic model may skip to Section 2.4, as the only change is the introduction of parameters for protocols.
In Sections 2.4 and 2.5 we further extend the model with features not present in the basic model deﬁned in
[15], namely trace restrictions (similar to preconditions in PCL and elsewhere), satisﬁability predicates, and new
security notions.
2.1. Overview
The basic entities in our framework are role speciﬁcations. Every role speciﬁcation consists of a sequence
of uniquely labeled events describing the messages an agent shall send and receive, when it executes the role
speciﬁcation, as well as certain security claims. The role speciﬁcation includes constants which roughly cor-
respond to nonces, variables which store values read from the network, and parameters which represent
input.
A protocol is a collection of role speciﬁcations that communicate by sending and receiving messages. More
precisely, a protocol is a partial function, mapping role names to role speciﬁcations. A run is an execution of a
role speciﬁcation by an agent. Communication between runs is asynchronous and is modeled by agents read-
ing messages from and writing messages to a shared input/output buffer (by executing read and send events).
As the buffer is completely under the control of the adversary, according to the standard Dolev-Yao intruder
model [19], we identify the buffer with the intruder knowledge. The actual behavior of the entire system, con-
sisting of the intruder and a set of agents executing a number of runs, is encoded in the traces of the system.
In some situations, we are not interested in all possible traces but in a subset of traces that have a certain
property; for instance, the subset of traces whose input values are secret. In that case, we talk about trace
restriction.
Security properties in our framework are local to a role and are described by the claim events in the role
speciﬁcations. Every claim event in a trace results in a statement about the trace that may or may not be true. In
this paper, we focus on three security properties: secrecy, authentication, and session key establishment. A secrecy
claim event is essentially the statement that something never enters the adversary’s knowledge, as determined by
the trace. Authentication is captured by the notion of synchronization. A synchronization claim event translates
into the statement that there are runs for the other protocol roles in the trace with read and send events that
match this run’s send and read events exactly, both in content and in order. Our notion of session keys is that
a session key is secret and identiﬁes a protocol session, in the sense that there is exactly one execution of every
protocol role sharing the session key.
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2.2. Security protocol speciﬁcation
Let ID be a set of identiﬁers, R a set of role names or roles for short, and F a set of (global) functions.
There are three types of identiﬁers: constants, variables, and parameters. Constants include the general notion of
nonces, and we will informally refer to some constants as nonces. Concatenation or tupling of terms is written
as (x, y). Encryptions of a term x with a term y are denoted by {|x |}y . Role terms can be considered as templates
for messages that are read or sent by the agents. The set of role terms is deﬁned as:
RoleTerm ::= ID | R | F(RoleTerm ∗)
| (RoleTerm ,RoleTerm) | {|RoleTerm |}RoleTerm
Terms that have been encrypted with a term, can only be decrypted by its inverse term which is either the
same term (for symmetric encryption) or the inverse key (for asymmetric encryption). We use k−1 to denote the
inverse key of a key k . In this work, functions from F are only used to construct long-term keys, such as pk(r),
sk(i), k(x, y). Short term session keys are represented by constants. In the remainder of the paper x, y , z range
over RoleTerm , and c, d over the ID set.
Example 1. The ﬁrst message sent by the initiator in the NSL protocol is denoted by {|ni, i |}pk(r), where ni ∈ ID
is a constant, i, r ∈ R are role names, and pk() ∈ F .
We say that x1 is a subterm of x2 if x1  x2, where  is the smallest transitive relation satisfying the following
rules, for all terms x1, x2:
x1  x1, x1  (x1, x2), x2  (x1, x2), x1  {|x1 |}x2 , x2  {|x1 |}x2 .
For a given set of labels L and a set of claims Claim we deﬁne the set of events E as:
E = {create(r), send(r, r′, x), read(r′, r, x), claim(r, c [, x]), end(r) ∣∣
 ∈ L, r, r′ ∈ R, x ∈ RoleTerm , c ∈ Claim}
The labels  extending the events are needed to disambiguate multiple occurrences of an event in protocol
speciﬁcations (e.g. when composing two instances of the NSL protocol). A second use of these labels is to
express which send and read events are supposed to correspond (e.g. in NSL the ﬁrst message sent by the
initiator is linked to the ﬁrst message received by the responder).
Event send(r, r′, x) denotes the sending of message x by r, apparently to r′. Likewise, read(r′, r, x) denotes
the reception of message x by r′, apparently sent by r. We interpret role terms of the form {|u |}v in a send event
as encryption with symmetric or public encryption keys, or signing with private signing keys. In a read we
interpret it as decryption with symmetric or private encryption keys, or veriﬁcation with public signing keys. An
agent can encrypt or decrypt a term only when it has the relevant key in its knowledge. Event claim(r, c [, x])
expresses that r upon execution of this event expects the security property associated with the claim c to hold
with optional argument x. A claim event is always local to a role, and does not imply that other roles expect the
security property associated with the claim c to hold for them. Events create(r) and end(r) are used to signal
the start and end of the role.
Example 2. The ﬁrst send event of the initiator in the NSL protocol is denoted by send1(i, r, {|ni, i |}pk(r)), where
ni ∈ ID is a constant and 1 is some label. The ﬁrst read event of the responder in the NSL protocol is denoted
by read1(i, r, {|ni, i |}pk(r)), where ni ∈ ID is a variable.
A role speciﬁcation is a pair (elist, type), where elist ∈ E∗ is a list of events and type is a function ID →
{const, param, variable} that assigns types to the identiﬁers that appear in elist. We require that there is only one
create and one end in the event list, and that they start and terminate the list. Furthermore, we require that the
role names in the create and end events are the same, and they match the role names that appear in claim events
and the sender and recipient, respectively, in send and read events. This is the speciﬁcation’s role name. The set
of all role speciﬁcations is denoted by RoleSpec .
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Note that only in the context of a role speciﬁcation rs can we talk about the set of variables or parameters.
For a role speciﬁcation rs = (elist, type), we write varrs(x) for the set of identiﬁers that appear in role term x and
are considered variables in the role speciﬁcation.
A protocol is a partial mapping of role names to role speciﬁcations, i.e.R → RoleSpec . We say that r is a role
in protocol P if r ∈ dom(P), the domain of P . If r is a role in protocol P and  is a label of an event in the event
list of r then we write  ∈ P(r). We extend this notation in the obvious way to  ∈ P . By ID(P) we denote the set
of all identiﬁers that appear in protocol P . The universe of protocols is denoted by Prot.
For a protocol P , we require that all labels are unique, except for the labels of corresponding read and send
events which have to be identical. For a set of protocols, we require that a label is used in at most one protocol.
We deﬁne a relation ≺′ on the events of a protocol as the union of the obvious event orders on the role
speciﬁcations. We extend this relation with all pairs of identically labeled send and read events so that such send
events always precede the corresponding read events. The partial order ≺ is the transitive closure of ≺′ and
represents causality preorder.
Example 3. The following example speciﬁes the NSL ′ protocol, which is the bottom right subprotocol in Fig.
1. Notice the parameter nr and the fact that ni′ is considered a constant by role i, whereas it is a variable for
role r.
NSL ′(i) = (create 1(i) · send2(i, r, {|ni′, i, nr |}pk(r))·
read3(r, i, {|ni′, nr′, r |}pk(i)) · send4(i, r, {|nr′ |}pk(r)) · end5(i),
{nr → param, ni′ → const , nr′ → variable})
NSL ′(r) = (create6(r) · read2(i, r, {|ni′, i, nr |}pk(r))·
send3(r, i, {|ni′, nr′, r |}pk(i)) · read4(i, r, {|nr′ |}pk(r)) · end7(r),
{nr → param, ni′ → variable , nr′ → const })
2.3. Runs and traces
In this section we describe how, through instantiation, an abstract role speciﬁcation can be transformed into
an execution of a role, which we call a run. Furthermore, we deﬁne how the interleaved operation of a collection
of runs deﬁnes the traces of a system.
Run terms model the actual messages sent in a protocol. Since the run terms are instantiations of role terms
they are deﬁned similarly. Let Runid be a set of run identiﬁers, IT a set of intruder-generated run terms and A
a set of agent names which is a disjoint union of a set of trusted and a set of untrusted agents, AT and AU ,
respectively. The set of run terms is deﬁned as:
RunTerm::= A | F(RunTerm∗) | IDRunid | IT | (RunTerm,RunTerm) | {|RunTerm|}RunTerm
The run terms of the form IDRunid and the terms in IT are called nonce run terms. The subterm relation  on
run terms is deﬁned similarly to the subterm relation on role terms. Since it is clear from the context which one
is used, we allow the same notation for both relations. In the remainder of the paper t, u, v range over RunTerm.
A role term is turned into a run term when abstract role names are replaced by concrete agent names, and
constants are made unique by extending them with a run identiﬁer. This is done by means of an instantiation,
which is a triplet (rid , , ), where rid ∈ Runid,  is a partial function from role names to agent names, and  is
a partial function from identiﬁers to run terms. We denote the set of all possible instantiations by Inst .
In the context of some role speciﬁcation rs with type function type, an instantiation inst = (rid , , ) turns a
role term x into a run term, if  is deﬁned for every role name that appears in x and varrs(x) ⊆ dom(). For any
f ∈ F and role terms x1, . . . , xn ∈ RoleTerm , instantiation is deﬁned recursively by:
inst(x) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(r) if x ≡ r ∈ R
crid if x ≡ c ∈ ID ∧ type(c) = const
(x) if x ∈ ID ∧ type(x) ∈ {param, variable}
f(inst(x1), . . . , inst(xn)) if x ≡ f(x1, . . . , xn)
(inst(x1), inst (x2)) if x ≡ (x1, x2)
{|inst(x1) |}inst(x2) if x ≡ {|x1 |}x2
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If an instantiation cannot be applied because varrs(x) ⊆ dom(), we say that x has free variables in this context.
Example 4. If we apply instantiation (42, {i → a, r → b}, {ni → ni41}) to the contents of the ﬁrst send event of
the responder in the NSL protocol {|ni, nr, r |}pk(i), we obtain {|ni41, nr42, b |}pk(a).
Instantiations are essential ingredients to deﬁne the notion of a run of a role. A run of a role speciﬁcation
rs = (elist, type) is a pair (inst, elist′), where inst ∈ Inst and elist′ is a sufﬁx of elist. In this deﬁnition we express
that one is mainly interested in the current state of an agent executing a role. We model this dynamic aspect by
requiring that the list elist′ ∈ E∗ contains the remaining events in the role speciﬁcation, and not the complete
role speciﬁcation. The instantiation inst contains the actual values of the variables and parameters, as well as
the agent names expected to execute the other protocol roles. The set of all runs is denoted by Runs. A run event
is a pair (inst, ev) ∈ Inst × E . These are the events that can be observed when executing a system. A system’s
behavior is represented by a sequence of run events, which we call a trace. The universe of traces is denoted by
Traces .
Let P be a protocol with a role speciﬁcation rs = (elist, type), and let inst = (rid , , ) be an instantiation.
The pair (inst, elist) is an initial run for rs if and only if dom() = dom(P) and dom() = type−1(param) ( is
deﬁned for all role parameters, specifying the run’s input). The set of all initial runs for all roles of a protocol P
is denoted by runsof(P). For a protocol set , we let
runsof() =
⋃
P∈
runsof(P).
Example 5. An initial run of the initiator of the NSL ′ protocol from Example 3 is ((42, {i → a, r → b}, {nr →
ni41, nr′ → ⊥}), create 1(i)·
send2(i, r, {|ni′, i, nr |}pk(r))· read3(r, i, {|ni′, nr′, r |}pk(i))· send4(i, r, {|nr′ |}pk(r))· end5(i)). Notice that nr is the only
parameter (and thus must be initialized), that variable nr′ has no initial value and that ni′ is a constant.
For a protocol set we consider a system with a number of runs (communicating with each other) executed
by agents in presence of an intruder.We assume a standardDolev-Yaomodel, inwhich the intruder has complete
control over the communication network. The knowledge of the intruder, denoted byM , is a subset of run terms.
He can decrypt messages if he knows the appropriate decryption key, and he can construct messages from his
knowledge set. We express this by requiring that M is closed, that is:
∀u,v∈M(u, v) ∈ M ⇒ {|u |}v ∈ M
∀u,v{|u |}v, v−1 ∈ M ⇒ u ∈ M
∀u,v(u, v) ∈ M ⇔ u, v ∈ M
The closure M of a set of run terms M is the smallest closed superset of M .
Due to the dynamic behavior of the system, the intruder knowledge increases during the execution.We assume
that the initial knowledge M0 of the intruder can be derived from the protocol and the context (e.g. the public
keys of all agents and the secret keys of all compromised agents). We require that IT ⊆ M0. The derivation of
the initial intruder knowledge from the protocol speciﬁcation is treated in detail in [14].
The behavior of the system is deﬁned as a transition relation between system states. Every state is determined
by an intruder knowledge setM containing run terms (which is also used to model an asynchronous communi-
cation between agents), and a set F containing all active runs.We denote by runids(F) the set of all run identiﬁers
that appear in F . Every transition is labeled with a run event (inst, ev) ∈ Inst × E .
The derivation rules for the system are given in Table 1. We denote by F [x/y] the set obtained from F when
x replaces y . Note that from run events used to label transitions, one can uniquely determine role speciﬁcations.
All instantiations that appear in a rule are applied in the context of this role speciﬁcation.
The create rule expresses that a new run can only be created if its run identiﬁer has not been used yet. The
end and claim rules express that these events can always be executed. Recall that M denotes the closure of the
setM . The send rule states that if a run executes a send event, the sent message (obtained by instantiating a role
term in the role speciﬁcation context determined by the run event) is added to the intruder knowledge and the
executing run proceeds to the next event.
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The read rule determines when a read event can be executed, with the help of a match predicate deﬁned as
follows:
Match(inst,m, t, inst′) ⇐⇒ inst = (rid , , ) ∧ inst′ = (rid , , ′) ∧  ⊆ ′ ∧
dom(′) = dom() ∪ varrs(m) ∧ inst′(m) = t.
The match predicate decides if an incoming message t can be matched against a pattern speciﬁed by a role term
m. With respect to the ﬁrst instantiation inst, the pattern may contain free variables. The idea is that the second
instantiation inst’ extends the ﬁrst instantiation by assigning values to the free variables such that the incoming
message equals the instantiated role term. Note that the run event determines role speciﬁcation rs .
Example 6. We have Match(inst,m, t, inst′) for inst = (42, {i → a, r → b}, {nr → ⊥}), m = {|ni, nr, r |}pk(i), t =
{|ni42, nr12, b |}pk(a), and inst′ = (42, {i → a, r → b}, {nr → nr12}). This models the ﬁrst receive event of agent
a executing the initiator role of NSL in run 42. The symbol ⊥ means that no value is assigned.
A state transition is the conclusion of an application of one of these rules. In this way, starting from the initial
state 0 = 〈M0,∅〉, where M0 refers to the initial intruder knowledge, we can derive all possible behaviors of a
system executing a protocol set .
We deﬁne the set of traces generated by the above derivation rules as a subset of Traces . Let  ∈ Traces be
a trace of length || = n, and denote by i the ith run event in  (starting with 0). Then  is a valid trace for the
system if there exist states 1,2, . . . ,n such that 0
0→ 1 1→ · · · n−1→ n is a valid derivation. We denote the
set of all valid traces for the protocol set  by Tr (). When we consider the trace set Tr ({P } ∪) we say that
P runs in the context of .
We reconstruct state information from a trace as follows. If i is a run event from trace , then Mi is the
intruder knowledge component M of the state right before the execution of i . Thus for all protocols P and
traces  ∈ Tr (P), M0 = M0.
Next, we deﬁne a useful short hand. Let  be a protocol set with P ∈ , and let  ∈ Tr (). A cast for P
in  is a map cast : dom(P) → Runid such that for some ﬁxed , for every role r ∈ dom(P) there is a run event
i = ((cast(r), , ·), create(r))with  ∈ P . Intuitively, for a trace , a cast is an assignment of runs to roles, which
expresses the possibility that these runs together form a session of the protocol. We denote the set of casts for
P and  by Cast(P ,).
Table 1
Derivation rules
[create] run = (inst, create (r) · elist ) ∈ runsof (), inst = (rid , , ), rid ∈ runids (F)
〈M , F 〉 (inst,create(r))→ 〈M , F ∪ {(inst, elist)}〉
[end ] run = (inst, end (r)) ∈ F ,
〈M , F 〉 (inst,end(r))→ 〈M , F [(inst, ε)/run]〉
[send ] run = (inst, send(m) · elist) ∈ F
〈M , F 〉 (inst,send(m))→ 〈M ∪ {inst(m)}, F [(inst, elist)/run]〉
[read ] run = (inst, read(m) · elist) ∈ F , t ∈ M ,Match(inst,m, t, inst
′)
〈M , F 〉 (inst
′,read(m))→ 〈M , F [(inst′, elist)/run]〉
[claim] run = (inst, claim(r, c [, x]) · elist) ∈ F
〈M , F 〉 (inst,claim(r,c [,x]))→ 〈M , F [(inst, elist)/run]〉
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Example 7. We illustrate the concept of a trace by providing, in Fig. 3, a possible trace of the NSL ′ protocol
from Example 3. This trace consists of the execution of three runs. The ﬁrst run is an instantiation of role i, with
instantiation (1, {i → a, r → b}, {nr → u, nr′ → ⊥}), where a and b are agents, u is a nonce run term, and⊥means
that no value has been assigned yet. The second run instantiates role i as (2, {i → a, r → b}, {nr → v, nr′ → ⊥}),
for nonce run term v /= u. The third run is an instantiation of the responder role r, through (3, {i → a, r →
b}, {nr → u, ni′ → ⊥}). Since runs 1 and 3 are instantiated such that they correspond, they can be executed up
to completion. In contrast, run 2 is blocked.
After execution of this trace the intruder knowledge M is extended with the information contained in the
four send events from the trace. Thus we have that M is equal to:
M0 ∪ {{|ni′2, i, v |}pk(r), {|ni′1, i, u |}pk(r), {|ni′1, nr′3, r |}pk(i), {|nr′3 |}pk(r)}
There are two casts for the NSL ′ protocol in this trace: {i → 1, r → 3} and {i → 2, r → 3}.
2.4. Trace restrictions
In Sections 2.2 and 2.3 we have described the semantics proposed by Cremers and Mauw in [15]. In this
and the next section we deﬁne mechanisms for properly handling parameters, and we add several new security
properties to the semantics, both important for protocol composition.
Note that there are essentially no restrictions on which values parameters take in the semantics. We interpret
parameters as input to the protocols, and as such we need to specify where the protocol gets its input from.
We do this on the level of protocol sets by specifying which protocols produce output and which protocols are
allowed to use this output as input. This speciﬁcation is done by means of trace restrictions.
When we study protocols in isolation, we do not want to consider how the input is created, we only want
to consider what properties hold for the input. We model these properties using trace restrictions. While some
trace restrictions are related or similar to security properties, trace restrictions do not model protocol security
properties, but rather usage of the protocols.
A trace restriction is essentially a predicate on a trace set. We use this predicate as a ﬁlter, selecting a subset
of the trace set.
Deﬁnition 8. Let  be a protocol set, and let 
 be a predicate on Tr (). Then
Tr (;
) = { ∈ Tr () | 
()}.
Fig. 3. Example trace of the NSL′ protocol ( = {i → a, r → b}).
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In practice, a user ﬁrst executing a protocol P and then executing a second protocol Q might pass values
obtained from P as input to the execution ofQ. In a trace, the mechanism for passing the input value is encoded
by initializing the parameter for the Q-run of an agent in some role, to a value produced by the P -run of the
same agent acting in the same role.
There are two variants to this use. Either the user inputs a value generated by P into one or more executions
of the same role of Q, or he inputs a value into just one execution of the Q role. We deﬁne two trace restrictions
corresponding to these uses, labeled IO and IO!.
We say that a protocol P establishes an identiﬁer c if for any trace  and every occurrence of events
(inst, end(r)),  ∈ P , in the trace, inst is deﬁned at c. This condition can be veriﬁed by a syntactical analysis.
For the remainder of this section, let be a protocol set, let′ ⊆  be a set where every protocol establishes
c, and let′′ ⊆  be a protocol set where every protocol has d as a parameter in every role. Let  ∈ Tr (), and
let I contain all subscripts of events in  which correspond to a create event from ′′:
I = {i | i = (insti , create(ri)) ∧  ∈ ′′}.
For each i ∈ I , deﬁne the sets
Ai = {j | j = (instj , create(rj)) ∧  ∈ ′′ ∧ instj(d) = insti(d)} and
Bi = {j | j = (instj , end(ri)) ∧  ∈ ′ ∧ instj(c) = insti(d)}.
The set Ai contains the runs that received the same input as the run that was started in i , and Bi contains the
set of runs that could have produced this input. We also deﬁne the following subsets:
A′i = {j ∈ Ai | ∀r ∈ R : instj(r) = insti(r)} and
B′i = {j ∈ Bi | ∀r ∈ R : instj(r) = insti(r)},
where the equality is in the sense that either both are deﬁned and equal, or both are undeﬁned. The set A′i is
therefore the subset of Ai of which the runs have the same  as i , that is, they believe they are communicating
with the same partners. The set B′i has a similar interpretation.
Deﬁnition 9.Let′ = ∅,′′ be such that all protocols in′ ∪′′ have the same role set.We deﬁne the predicates

IO(;′,′′, c, d) ⇔ ∀i ∈ I ∃j ∈ B′i ∀k ∈ A′i : j < k
and

IO!(;′,′′, c, d) ⇔ ∀i ∈ I∃f : A′i → B′i : f injective ∧ (∀j ∈ A′i : f(j) < j).
The trace restriction 
IO(;′,′′, c, d) says that a protocol set ′′ takes its input from a protocol set ′.
As explained before, this means that any run of a role of a protocol in ′′ initializes its input parameter d to a
value that has been recorded in c earlier in the trace, in a run of the corresponding role of a protocol in′. (The
initialization is speciﬁed by deﬁning  only at the input parameters when the run is created.) In the stricter trace
restriction, 
IO!(;′,′′, c, d) it is required that at most one run of a role of a protocol in ′′ can take as its
input a value produced in a run of the corresponding role of a protocol in ′. In order to ease notation, when
 = 1 ∪2, ′ is a subset of 1 and ′′ is a subset of 2, instead of writing Tr (;
IO(·;′,′′, c, d)) and
Tr (;
IO!(·;′,′′, c, d)), we simply write Tr (1〈c〉 ∪2〈c/d〉) and Tr (1〈c〉 ∪2〈c!/d〉), respectively.
Our main goal is to study security properties of component protocols in isolation. When one protocol takes
input from another protocol, we do not want to include the second protocol in the analysis. Our strategy is
instead to specify preconditions on the input to our protocol, sufﬁcient for the protocol to achieve its goals. We
express these preconditions in terms of trace restrictions.
Next, we deﬁne what it means for input to be secret. We emphasize that the trace restriction makes no claim
about what eventually happens with the input. It may very well not remain secret. But the construction is such
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that it is possible to keep the input secret. As an example, consider the empty protocol with a claim for secrecy
of the input identiﬁer. Under a secret trace restriction on the input, the secrecy claim should always be satisﬁed.
To achieve this, we resort to a technical trick. The idea is that since d is a parameter in the run with run identiﬁer
rid , the run term drid is guaranteed by the semantics not to be known by the adversary or any other execution
at the start of the run. Note that drid should not be thought of as a locally generated nonce, it is merely a
convenient name for something generated elsewhere.
Deﬁnition 10. We deﬁne the predicate

secret(;′′, d) ⇔ ∀i ∈ I : j = minAi ∧ instj = (rid , ·, ·) ⇒ insti(d) = drid.
A somewhat stronger notion of secrecy is that of session key, where we not only have secrecy, but also a
notion of a session.
Deﬁnition 11. Let the event i have instantiation insti , label i and role ri , with i ∈ Pi . We deﬁne the predicate

session(;′, d) ⇔ ∀i ∈ I : (∃j ∈ A′i : instj = (rid , ·, ·) ∧ insti(d) = drid)∧
(∃f : A′i → R : f injective ∧ ∀j ∈ A′i : j ∈ Pi ∧ f(j) = rj)
Finally, a much simpler concept is that the protocol takes its input from the adversary. In this case, the idea
is that the protocol does not really care about where its input comes from, just that it gets its input. We do not
believe this is interesting on its own, but it is a useful tool in analysis. One such example is protocols where the
chaining nonce is public, for instance NSL variants using signatures instead of public key encryption.
Deﬁnition 12. We deﬁne the predicate

adversary (;′, d) ⇔ ∀1  i  || : i = (inst, create(r)) ∧  ∈ ′ ⇒ inst(d) ∈ Mi .
To simplify the notation, we denote these trace sets simply as Tr (〈secret /d〉), Tr (〈session/d〉), and
Tr (〈adversary/d〉).
2.5. Security properties
We have already introduced claim events in the trace model. Claim events are not real protocol events, but
markers we put in a trace to indicate that a certain statement about the trace is supposed to hold. We can,
for instance, extend the role deﬁnition of NSL ′(i) from Example 3 with claim event claim8(i, secret , ni′), which
contains the claim secret . If an agent reaches this claim event during his execution of role i, it is intended that
an intruder will never learn the value of his nonce.
The deﬁnition of security properties proceeds in three steps. First, we deﬁne the general signature of a security
property, which we consider a predicate on protocol traces. Next, we express that such a property is satisﬁed
if it holds for all traces of the protocol. Finally, we deﬁne a number of security properties, such as secrecy and
authentication.
In general, a security property is a predicate on the traces of a protocol. So, given protocol and a claim cl,
fcl(, claim(r, cl,m)) assigns truth values to pairs (inst,), where  is a trace of  and inst is an instantiation
of the variables in the claim event.
Deﬁnition 13.A security property is a function fcl, cl ∈ Claim, that associates with every pair (, ev) of a protocol
set  and a role claim event ev with claim cl, a predicate on pairs of instantiations and traces:
fcl : P(Prot)× {claim(r, cl,m) |  ∈ L, r ∈ R,m ∈ RoleTerm }
→
⋃
∈P(Prot)
{Inst × Tr () → {true, false}},
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where P(Prot) is the powerset of the set of all protocols.
Note that a context is needed to evaluate an instantiation, and the label  on the role claim event determines
this context.
A security property fcl is satisﬁed in protocol set if it yields true for all protocol traces containing this claim
cl. This is expressed in the following deﬁnition. However, we have included the additional restriction that only
claims concerning sessions between trusted agents are evaluated. One cannot expect, for instance, that a shared
secret is really secret if one of the communication partners is corrupted. Notice that this does not rule out the
possibility that a secret in a trusted session is broken due to an interleaving of a session with untrusted partners.
Of course there are security properties for which this restriction is not appropriate, but since the properties used
in this paper all have this restriction in common, it is included in the following deﬁnition of satisfaction.
Deﬁnition 14. Let fcl be a security property, a protocol set, and  the label of a claim event with claim cl. We
say that  satisﬁes the claim , denoted by sat(, ), if
∀∈Tr ()∀i : i=(inst, claim(r, cl,m))⇒fcl(, claim(r, cl,m))(inst,)∨(inst = (·, , ·)∧im () ⊆ AT ).
Weextend this in the obviouswaywith trace restrictions and to sets of claimevent labelswriting sat(, {i};
).
As an example, we can claim secrecy for a particular role term m by inserting a suitable claim event into
the protocol speciﬁcation. That claim event will translate into the following statement about a trace : The
adversary never learns the run term inst(m) in the trace .
Deﬁnition 15. Let  ∈ Tr (). The security property fsecret associates the protocol set  and the claim event
ev = claim(r, secret ,m) with the statement
fsecret(, ev)(inst,) ⇔ inst(m) ∈ M||+1,
where the initial intruder knowledge is determined from .
We also need to express that a given run is part of a session for its protocol. We achieve this by requiring that
no two runs of the same role of the protocol have the same value for the session identiﬁer (the argument). We
call this property session uniqueness.
Deﬁnition 16. The security property fsession-unique associates the protocol set  and the claim event
ev = claim(r, session -unique,m) with the statement
fsession-unique(, ev)(inst,) ⇔ ∀1  i, j  || :
(i = (insti , claim(r, ·, ·)) ∧
j = (instj , claim(r, ·, ·)) ∧
insti(m) = instj(m) = inst(m)) ⇒ i = j.
Many protocols establish session keys, and we identify three requirements that a session key needs to satisfy:
(1) The session key must be secret.
(2) There must be a session, that is, one run of each role of the protocol must know the session key.
(3) The key must act as a session identiﬁer, that is, it must be unique across all runs of the same role of the
same protocol.
The ﬁrst requirement is taken care of by the secrecy property and the third requirement by the session-unique
property. The second requirement is taken care of by data agreement for the session key, which we now deﬁne.
The idea is that, for every other role in the protocol, there must exist a run that has the same value for the
argument term at some event causally preceding the claiming event. These runs must also agree on which agent
executes which role, thus possibly forming a session of the protocol.
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Deﬁnition 17. The security property fdata-agree associates the protocol set  and the claim event ev = claim(r,
data -agree ,m), with  ∈ P , P ∈ , with the statement
fdata-agree(, ev)(inst,) ⇔ ∃cast ∈ Cast(P ,) :
∀r′ ∈ dom(P) ∃j : j = (instj , ·) ∧
instj = (cast(r′), ·, ·) ∧ instj(m) = inst(m).
Note that causal precedence is implicitly required in this deﬁnition. Given any trace with a claim event, we
can create a new trace by removing any event not causally preceding the claim event. Hence, for the deﬁnition
to be satisﬁed, there must be agreeing events for all roles causally preceding the claim event.
Now we can deﬁne the session key claim.
Deﬁnition 18. The security property fsession associates the protocol set  and the claim event ev = claim(r,
session ,m) with the statement
fsession(, ev)(inst,) ⇔ fsecret(, claim(r, secret ,m))(inst,) ∧
fsession-unique(, claim(r, session -unique,m))(inst,) ∧
fdata-agree(, claim(r, data -agree ,m))(inst,).
We also deﬁne a weaker session key claim, where we drop the requirement about the agreement with (and
therefore existence of) communication partners.
Deﬁnition 19. The security property fwsession associates the protocol set  and the claim event ev = claim(r,
wsession ,m) with the statement
fwsession(, ev)(inst,) ⇔ fsecret(, claim(r, secret ,m))(inst,) ∧
fsession-unique(, claim(r, session -unique,m))(inst,).
Finally, we deal with authentication. Our preferred notion is synchronization [16], a strong form of authen-
tication. A non-injective synchronization claim holds if there are executions of the other protocol roles whose
read and send events match the claiming execution’s events, up to the claim event. An even stronger notion of
authentication, injective synchronization, holds if there is exactly one set of executions of the other protocol roles
such that the read and send events match the claiming execution’s events, up to the claim event.
Deﬁnition 20.The security property fsynch associates the protocol set and the claim event ev = claim(r, synch ),
 ∈ P for some P ∈  with the statement
fsynch(, ev)(inst,) ⇔ ∃cast ∈ Cast(P ,), 1  i  || : i = (inst, ev) ∧
∀r′ ∈ dom(P)∀′ ∈ P(r) : ′ ∈ P(r′) ∧ read′ ≺ ev
⇒ ∃j < k < i :
j = (inst′′, send′(m)) ∧ k = (inst′′′, read′(m′)) ∧
inst′′(m) = inst′′′(m′) ∧
((inst′′ = (cast(r), ·, ·) ∧ inst′′′ = (cast(r′), ·, ·)) ∨
(inst′′ = (cast(r′), ·, ·) ∧ inst′′′ = (cast(r), ·, ·))).
Deﬁnition 21. The security property fi-synch associates the protocol set  and the claim event ev = claim(r,
i -synch ),  ∈ P for some P ∈  with the statement
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fi-synch(, ev)(inst,) ⇔ ∃!cast ∈ Cast(P ,), 1  i  || : i = (inst, ev) ∧
∀r′ ∈ dom(P)∀′ ∈ P(r) : ′ ∈ P(r′) ∧ read′ ≺ ev
⇒ ∃j < k < i :
j = (inst′′, send′(m)) ∧ k = (inst′′′, read′(m′)) ∧
inst′′(m) = inst′′′(m′) ∧
((inst′′ = (cast(r), ·, ·) ∧ inst′′′ = (cast(r′), ·, ·)) ∨
(inst′′ = (cast(r′), ·, ·) ∧ inst′′′ = (cast(r), ·, ·))).
Certain security properties can be evaluated by merely looking at the events in a trace that belong to the
protocol in which the claim was made. This class of properties are called protocol-centric, and as we will see,
we can prove theorems that apply to all properties in this class. Since authentication properties are concerned
with the occurrence of events of the given protocol, they are typical members of this class.
Deﬁnition 22. Let P be a protocol, and  a protocol set. Denote by P and  the maps on traces that remove
any protocol event that does not belong to P or a protocol in , respectively.
Let s be any bijection on the set of nonce run terms {crid | c ∈ ID, rid ∈ Runid} ∪ IT . This is basically a
renaming of nonce run terms. Any such bijection can be naturally extended to a bijection on the set of run terms.
For any trace , we deﬁne s() to be the trace where every instantiation inst is replaced with s ◦ inst.
Deﬁnition 23. We say that a security property fcl is protocol-centric if for any (, ev) such that fcl is deﬁned and
ev belongs to a protocol P ∈ , and for any renaming s on nonce run terms,
∀,′∀inst ∈ Inst : s(P ()) = P (′) ⇒ fcl(, ev)(inst,) = fcl(, ev)(s ◦ inst,′).
(The renaming s is included in this deﬁnition for technical reasons.)
Weobserve that session-unique, data -agree, synch, and i -synch are protocol-centric, while secret and therefore
session are not.
3. Framework for reasoning
Automatically proving large protocols secure is computationally challenging. If the protocol can be split into
a sequential composition of several subprotocols, one approach to veriﬁcation is to analyze the subprotocols
in a common context. Properties proved for each of the subprotocols running in this multi-protocol context
can often be used to deduce properties for the composed protocol. Note that some authors consider protocols
running in a multi-protocol context to be composed in parallel. We use “composition” only about operations
that combine two ormore protocol objects into a new protocol object. The only form of composition considered
in this paper is sequential composition.
Unfortunately, automatically verifying protocol properties in such a multi-protocol context is not compu-
tationally easier than analyzing the composed protocol itself. The ideal is to study each subprotocol in perfect
isolation, without consideration of any other protocols. Our approach is to study under which conditions pro-
tocols running in parallel can be shown not to interfere with each other, such that results obtained by analysis
in isolation will be valid for a multi-protocol context.
Our approach is to use a very strong, but efﬁciently veriﬁable notion of independence between protocols.
We show how to design protocols to ensure such independence without incurring any signiﬁcant performance
penalty. We then prove a number of theorems showing conditions under which protocols can run in a multi-
protocol context without interfering with each other. Finally, we deﬁne sequential protocol composition (similar
to the one in PCL) and show how properties of subprotocols can be combined to give security properties for
the composed protocols.
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We use the formal model described in Section 2, with two restrictions:
(1) We require that the partial function  in instantiations assigns only nonce run terms to variables and
parameters.
(2) We restrict ourselves to protocols that use secret long-term keys only as keys, never as content of messages.
The ﬁrst restriction is essential for the notion of strong independence, deﬁned in the next section. We refer
to Section 6 for a discussion of the implications. The second restriction could be lifted, but this would subtly
complicate analysis, since the use of long-term secret keys becomes much harder to predict.
3.1. Independence
We say that two protocols are independent if no encryption term produced by the ﬁrst protocol running in
the context of the second protocol will be decrypted or veriﬁed by the second protocol, and vice versa. Formally:
Deﬁnition 24. Let 1,2 be two disjoint protocol sets, and let 
 be a (possibly empty) trace restriction. We say
that1 and2 are independent in the context of 
, denoted indep(1,2;
) (alternatively if 
 is empty,1 and
2 are independent, denoted indep(1,2)), if
∀ ∈ Tr (1 ∪2;
) ∀x, y , x′, y ′ ∈ RoleTerm :(
i = (inst, send(m)) ∧
(
j = (inst′, read′(m′)) ∨ j = (inst′, send′(m′)) ∨
j = (inst′, claim′(·, ·,m′))
) ∧({|x |}y  m ∧ {|x′ |}y ′  m′ ∧ inst({|x |}y) = inst′({|x′ |}y ′))
)
⇒ (, ′ ∈ 1 ∨ , ′ ∈ 2).
In general, proving independence is a non-trivial problem, but for many protocol sets it is easy in the sense
that the protocol sets satisfy an even stronger notion of independence.We say that two protocol sets are strongly
independent if they have no encryptions of the same form. Unlike independence, strong independence can be
easily veriﬁed at the syntactical level, and it implies independence. Note that different protocols can use the
same cryptographic keys and still be strongly independent, and thus independent.
Deﬁnition 25. Let 0 and 1 be two disjoint protocol sets. We say that 0 and 1 are strongly independent,
denoted s−indep(0,1), if for any b ∈ {0, 1}, any role speciﬁcation (elist · send(m) · elist′, type) in a protocol in
b, any role terms x, y , any role speciﬁcations (elist′′ · send(m′) · elist′′′, type′), (elist′′ · read(m′) · elist′′′, type′) or
(elist′′ · claim(r, c,m′) · elist′′′, type′) in protocols of1−b, any map s on the set ID and any map s′ on the set R,
{|x |}y  m ⇒ {|s(s′(x)) |}s(s′(y))  m′.
Note that any map s on identiﬁers and s′ on roles naturally induce maps on the set of role terms and we
identify these maps with s and s′. Also note that since strong independence is a syntactical property, there is no
need to consider traces or trace restrictions.
Theorem 26. If two protocol sets 1 and 2 are strongly independent, then they are independent.
Proof. Obvious from the fact that only nonce run terms are assigned to variables and parameters. 
The notion of strongly independent protocols is obviously very strong, and there are many independent
protocols that are not strongly independent. However, it is possible to verify strong independence by a simple
syntactical check on the protocols.Obviously, strong independencemaynot be useful for analyzing some existing
protocols, but it does cover many deployed protocols (see Section 4).
One way to achieve strong independence is to use separate key infrastructures for every protocol. Unfortu-
nately, this is expensive and wasteful. A more practical way to get strong independence is through protocol tags.
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Every protocol is given a unique tag which is embedded into every ciphertext the protocol makes. This trivially
implies strong independence.
Protocol tagsmaybe adesirable approach for protocol design, since they typically require no extra bandwidth,
and only modest extra computational effort.
Modern signature schemes typically process the message to be signed with a hash function, create a signature
tag, and attach the tag to the message. Adding a protocol tag of reasonable length (say 128 bits) to the message
will usually result in a minor increase in the cost of computing the hash function. Since the signature is simply
attached to the message, and both signer and veriﬁer know the protocol tag, there is no need to actually transmit
the protocol tag. The signer can remove the tag from the message before transmitting, the veriﬁer puts the tag
back in before verifying. A signature made by one protocol will not pass the veriﬁcation by a second protocol.
Modern encryption schemes typically allow for part of the message to be left unencrypted but authenticated.
Again, if we include the protocol tag in the unencrypted part, the encrypter can remove the tag before transmis-
sion and the decrypter can insert the tag prior to decryption. Typically, a protocol tag of reasonable length will
result in a minor increase in the cost of authentication.
As for hash-like function evaluations, most cryptographically interesting functions either allow the protocol
tag tobe inserted into the function evaluation, or allowcryptographic separationbychoosingdistinct parameters.
The computational cost of most such measures are expected to be modest.
To summarize, protocol tags typically have no bandwidth cost and modest computational cost. This suggests
that protocol tagging is a viable and sensible strategy for protocol design.
3.2. Multi-protocol environments
Once we have independence, we are ready to prove that any protocol remains correct in the presence of
independent protocols. The general idea for proving all of the results in this section is to deﬁne maps between
trace sets, and then argue that the predicate derived from a claim statement remains unchanged under this map.
The next theorem says that if one protocol set keeps something secret, it will keep it secret even in the presence
of a second, but independent, protocol set.
Theorem 27. Let 1 and 2 be two independent protocol sets. Let  be the label of some secret claim event in 1.
Then
sat(1, ) ⇒ sat(1 ∪2, ).
Proof. Let S be the set of nonce run terms in  originating in runs of roles from protocols in2. Let s : S → IT
be an injection such that no term in the image of s appears in . We can extend s to the set of nonce run terms by
letting s be the identity where it is not already deﬁned. This map can then be extended naturally to a renaming
map on the set of run terms.
We construct a new trace ′ from  by removing any events belonging to runs of roles from protocols in2,
and replacing any other event (inst, ev) by (s ◦ inst, ev). (Since s renames only nonce run terms, the composition
s ◦ inst may affect only the  function of inst.) Note that by independence, if any nonce run term originates in
a run of a role of a protocol in 2, the only way a run of a role of a protocol in 1 will read that nonce run
term is if the adversary also knows that nonce run term. From the semantics, we have that a nonce of 2 can
only occur in a run of a role of 1 as a subterm of an instantiated variable. Therefore, if we replace the nonce
run term by an attacker-generated nonce run term (such that the type constraints on the containing variable
are met), the trace will still be valid even after the 2-events are removed. This means that ′ ∈ Tr (1).
There is always a canonical choice of injection s (given the well-ordering on the nonce run terms induced by
the natural numbers), and this gives us a map
 : Tr (1 ∪2) → Tr (1). (1)
Note that  = s ◦ 1 .
Now consider a run term t claimed secret in . In ′, the corresponding run term is s(t), and we know that
this is secret. We ﬁrst determine why s(t) is secret, and we may as well assume that s(t) is a non-tuple run term.
If s(t) has the form f(u) for some function f and run term u, then t is secret by assumption. If s(t) is a nonce
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run term, we know that ﬁrst of all s(t)must originate in a run of a role of a protocol in1. Second, every time it
appears in a sent run term, it must be inside an encryption term. By independence, no 2-run will decrypt that
ciphertext. Therefore, t must be secret in . Otherwise, t must have the form {|u |}v for some run terms u and v. If
s(u) is secret, we must show that u is secret. We consider u instead of t and return to the start of the argument.
Otherwise, s(v)must be secret. By independence, it is sufﬁcient to show that v is secret, so we consider v instead
of t and return to the start of the argument.
Since terms cannot be inﬁnitely nested, this argument chain must eventually stop, and in the process prove
that t is secret in . This concludes the proof. 
If secrecy of some nonce is not important for satisfying some secrecy claim in some protocol set, then passing
the nonce to an independent protocol set will not compromise the secrecy claim. The intuition is that the worst
an independent protocol can do is to reveal the nonce to the intruder, and therefore we only need to analyze
what happens in that case.
Deﬁnition 28. Let P be a protocol establishing c. Then P 〈c∗〉 is the protocol
P 〈c∗〉 = {r → s · send(r, r0,r1(r), c) · end(r) | P(r) = s · end(r)},
where r0 and r1 are two distinct roles of P and r0,r1(r) is r0 when r = r0, otherwise r1.
We extend this notation to protocol sets in the obvious way, writing 〈c∗〉.
Theorem 29. Let1〈c∗〉 and2〈adversary/d〉 be two independent protocol sets and let  be the label of some secret
claim event in 1. Then
sat(1〈c∗〉, ) ⇒ sat(1〈c〉 ∪2〈c/d〉, ).
Proof. It is clear that Tr (1〈c〉 ∪2〈c/d〉) embeds naturally in Tr (1〈c∗〉 ∪2〈adversary/d〉). Furthermore,
under this embedding the intruder knowledge is strictly increased. By Theorem 27, the secrecy claim holds in
the latter trace set. It must therefore also hold in the former trace set and the theorem is proven. 
If secrecy of some nonce may be important for some secrecy claim, then passing the nonce to an independent
protocol set that preserves the secrecy of its input will not compromise the secrecy claim. (Note that the secrecy
claims in the second protocol must be positioned at the start of the role. Otherwise, the protocol would be
allowed to compromise the secrecy of the input as long as none of its roles reaches its secrecy claim.)
Theorem 30. Let 1〈c〉 and 2〈c/d〉 be two protocol sets, let ′1 ⊆ 1 be a set of protocols establishing c and
′2 ⊆ 2 be a set of protocols with d as a parameter. Let  ∈ 1 ∪2 be the label of some secret claim event. If
1 and 2 are independent under the trace restrictions 
IO(·;′1,′2, c, d) and 
secret(·;′2, d), then
sat(1, {i} ∪ {}) ∧ sat(2〈secret /d〉, {′i} ∪ {}) ⇒ sat(1〈c〉 ∪2〈c/d〉, ).
Here we assume that {i} are the labels of claim events {claimi (ri , secret , c)} in every role of every protocol in 1
that establishes c and the {′i} are labels of claim events {claim′i (r′i , secret , d)} in every role of every protocol in2
that has d as a parameter. The event claim′i (r
′
i , secret , d) is assumed to occur before any send or read event in the
role speciﬁcation.
Proof. Let  ∈ Tr (1〈c〉 ∪2〈c/d〉) be a trace. Let I be the set of indexes such that i = (insti , create(r)) for
some role r of a protocol Q in 2 that takes c as input for the parameter d . For each i, deﬁne the set
Ai = {j ∈ I | instj(d) = insti(d)}.
Let ridi be such that minAi = ((ridi , ·, ·), ·). Note that for any i ∈ I , the nonce run term dridi never appears in .
Let S = {insti(d) | i ∈ I} and S ′ = {dridi | i ∈ I}, and let s be the substitution that maps insti(d) to dridi for all
i in I .
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Weconstruct a new trace′ fromby replacing any event (inst, ev) that belongs to2 by the event (s ◦ inst, ev).
We claim that ′ ∈ Tr (1 ∪2〈secret /d〉), and we get a map
 : Tr (1〈c〉 ∪2〈c/d〉) → Tr (1 ∪2〈secret /d〉), (2)
along with a natural bijection
 : M → M′ .
We will prove the claim and construct the map  by induction. The theorem will then follow from a simple
observation.
Suppose ′0 · · ·′j−1 is a valid trace. The subterm relation  deﬁnes a partial ordering on Mj and M
′
j . Let
Uj and U ′j be the minimal elements of these sets, together with the terms that cannot be inferred from smaller
terms:
Uj = {x ∈ Mj | t  -minimal} ∪ {{|t |}t′ ∈ Mj | t ∈ Mj ∨ t′ ∈ Mj },
U ′j = {x ∈ M
′
j | t  -minimal} ∪ {{|t |}t′ ∈ M
′
j | t ∈ M
′
j ∨ t′ ∈ M
′
j }.
Note that Mj = Uj and M
′
j = U ′j . Also note that any encryption term in Uj and U ′j must originate from some
send event.
Deﬁne the sets
Vj = {t ∈ Uj | ∃t′ ∈ S : t′  t} and V ′j = {t ∈ U ′j | ∃t′ ∈ S ∪ s(S) : t′  t}.
Let Vj,1 and Vj,2 be the subsets of Vj of elements originating in 1 and 2, respectively. Let
V ′j,1 = {t ∈ U ′j | ∃t′ ∈ S : t′  t}
V ′j,2 = {t ∈ U ′j | ∃t′ ∈ s(S) : t′  t}
Let Wj = Uj \ Vj and W ′j = U ′j \ V ′j .
We can now prove the claim and construct the map  by induction on j. The induction hypothesis is that
′0 · · ·′j−1 is a valid trace and the following two properties hold for the structure of the intruder knowledge:
(1) S ∩ Vj = ∅ and (S ∪ s(S)) ∩ V ′j = ∅.
(2) There exists a bijection  : Uj → U ′j such that  restricted to Wj ∪ Vj,1 is the identity map, and  restricted
to Vj,2 corresponds to the map induced by the substitution s.
Note that the bijection  extends to a bijection  : Mj → M
′
j .
The induction basis is trivially satisﬁed for the empty trace and easy to verify for ′0.
The trace restriction on d is satisﬁed by design, so if j is a create event, ′0 · · ·′j is a valid trace. Also, the
same substitution is applied to all events in a run, so if j is a send, claim or end event, ′0 · · ·′j is a valid trace,
because the instantiations will be consistent with the run (basically the instantiation of the last event).
Next, we consider a read eventj = (inst, read(m)),′j = (inst′, read(m)).Wemust prove that inst′(m) ∈ M
′
j .
We know that inst(m) ∈ Mj . If inst(m) ∈ Wj we are done, and ′0 · · ·′j is a valid trace.
By independence we know that Vj,1 ∩ Vj,2 = ∅. Again by independence, if  ∈ b, then any run term in Vj
that is a subterm of inst(m) is also in Vj,b, and we get that inst(m) is in the closure of Vj,b ∪ Wj . Note that
V ′j,1 ∪ W ′j = Vj,1 ∪ Wj and V ′j,2 ∪ W ′j = s(Vj,2 ∪ Wj). If  ∈ 1 we have that inst′(m) = inst(m) ∈ M
′
j . If  ∈ 2 we
must have that inst′(m) = s(inst(m)) ∈ M′j . Therefore, under the induction hypothesis, ′0 · · ·′j is a valid trace.
We ﬁnish the inductive step by showing that (1) and (2) are also satisﬁed after the jth event. We need only
consider the eventj = (inst, send(m)),′j = (inst′, send(m)). The only interesting inference rule is ({|t |}t′ , t′) ⇒ t,
and we will show that the structure is unchanged by decryptions, up to some trivial rewriting.
For any set of run terms T , let rcl(T) be the smallest set of run terms containing T that is closed under tuple
creation and dissolution, encryption with known keys and removing signatures. This is the restricted closure,
closure without decryptions. Note that Mj = rcl(Uj).
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Under the induction hypothesis for U and U ′, if we augment U by decrypting a run term {|t |}t′ , where
t′ ∈ rcl(U), then we can augment U ′ by decrypting the run term ({|t |}t′), since (t′) ∈ rcl(U ′). If (t) = t, then
clearly we augmentU andU ′ in the same way. Likewise, if (t) = t, then (t) and t are equal up to substitution by
s, andU andU ′ are augmented in the sameway, up to substitution. Thismeans that S ∩ U = ∅, because we know
that (S ∪ s(S)) ∩ U ′ = ∅. The maps can therefore be extended, and (1) and (2) still hold true after augmentation.
Finally, if some of the elements in U are no longer minimal and are not encryptions that should be preserved,
then the corresponding elements in U ′ will no longer be minimal, nor be encryptions that should be preserved.
The other direction also holds. Therefore, we can discard all superﬂuous elements.
The list Uj+1 can be reached from Uj by adding the run terms obtained from the send event to the list, then
performing a ﬁnite sequence of decryption operations, then possibly discarding some elements from the list. The
above argument shows that the same operations (up to substitution) will turn U ′j into U ′j+1 in such a way that
(1) and (2) still hold for Uj+1 and U ′j+1. This completes the inductive step.
Tocomplete theproofof the theorem,weﬁrst observe that for any secrecy claimeventj = (inst, claim(·, ·,m))
there is ′j = (inst′, claim(·, ·,m)) and note that sat(1 ∪2〈secret /d〉, ) is true by Theorem 27, thus inst′(m) ∈
M
′
. Next, if inst(m) ∈ M, then (inst(m)) would be deﬁned and equal to inst′(m), contradicting inst′(m) ∈ M′ .
We conclude that inst(m) ∈ M and the secrecy claim holds. 
The following theorem states that protocol-centric claims remain valid if we execute a protocol in the context
of another protocol that is independent of the ﬁrst.
Theorem 31. Let 1 and 2 be two independent protocol sets, and let  be the label of some claim event in 1. If
the security property associated with  is protocol-centric, then
sat(1, ) ⇒ sat(1 ∪2, ).
Proof. Since 1 and 2 are independent, we can use the trace map  from (1). Let P be the protocol where
the claim event with label  appears. By construction of the  map, we have s(P ()) = P (()), for some
substitution s. Since the claim is protocol-centric, we are done. 
When one protocol establishes session for some nonce run term, and a second protocol expects a session key
as input, we can use the nonce run term from the ﬁrst protocol as input to the second, without compromising
any protocol-centric security properties.
Note that in the following two results, we restrict to exactly one protocol creating output and one protocol
taking input. This is for simplicity, and can easily be solved using protocol tags to create many distinct variants
of a single protocol.
Theorem 32. Let 1 and 2 be two protocol sets, such that P ∈ 1 is the only protocol establishing c and Q ∈ 2
is the only protocol taking c as input for d. Let  be the label of a protocol-centric claim event in 1 or 2. If 1
and 2 are independent under the trace restrictions 
IO!(·; P ,Q, c, d) and 
secret(·;Q, d), then
sat(1, {i} ∪ {}) ∧ sat(2〈session/d〉, {′i} ∪ {}) ⇒ sat(1〈c〉 ∪2〈c!/d〉, ),
where {i} are labels of claim events {claimi (ri , session , c)} in every role of P , and {′i} are labels of claim events{claim′i (r′i , secret , d)} in every role Q, occurring before any send or read event in the role speciﬁcation.
Proof. Let  be in a protocol R. First, we note that the map  : Tr (1〈c〉 ∪2〈c!/d〉) → Tr (1 ∪2〈secret /d〉)
from (2) exists, since the session claims imply corresponding secret claims. Since for some substitution s,
s(R()) = R(()), we only need to show that the session trace restriction is satisﬁed for the input to Q,
and the result will follow from Theorem 31. Because of the data -agree claims, we have a full session for P , and
by the session-unique claims, this session is unique. Thus for any end event for any role r of P , there are no other
end events for that role with the same value for c. Hence, the session trace restriction is satisﬁed. 
Finally, we combine the previous theorems into a statement about preservation of session secrecy.
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Corollary 33. Let1 and2 be two protocol sets, such that P ∈ 1 is the only protocol establishing c and Q ∈ 2
is the only protocol taking c as input for d. Let  be the label of a (weak) session claim in 1 or 2. If 1 and 2
are independent under the trace restrictions 
IO!(·; P ,Q, c, d) and 
secret(·;Q, d), then
sat(1, {i} ∪ {}) ∧ sat(2〈session/d〉, {′i} ∪ {}) ⇒ sat(1〈c〉 ∪2〈c!/d〉, ),
where {i} are labels of claim events {claimi (ri , session , c)} in every role of P , and {′i} are labels of claim events{claim′i (r′i , secret , d)} in every role Q, occurring before any send or read event in the role speciﬁcation.
Proof. First we apply Theorem 27 and Theorem 31 to establish sat(1 ∪2〈session/d〉, {i} ∪ {′i}) (separately
establishing the three parts of the session claims: secret, session-unique and data-agree). The results follows by
further applications of Theorem 30 and Theorem 32. 
3.3. Composition
In this section we study sequential composition and show how certain security properties of a composed
protocol follow from security properties of the subprotocols analyzed in a multi-protocol setting.
As discussed in Section 1, sequential composition (without passing information) of two protocols does not in
general preserve synchronization. The problem is that if there is no mechanism to bind the two subprotocols to
each other in the composedprotocol, different runs canbe interleavedwith each other, breaking synchronization.
Therefore, there must be a mechanism that connects the two subprotocols. We achieve this by letting the
ﬁrst subprotocol pass information to the next subprotocol. (A slightly more general deﬁnition of chaining
composition allowing more than one parameter appears in PCL.)
Deﬁnition 34.Let rs1 = (elist1 · end(r), type1) and rs2 = (create(r)· elist2, type2) ∈ RoleSpec . The sequential com-
position of role speciﬁcations rs1 and rs2 is the role speciﬁcation rs1 · rs2 = (elist1 · elist2, type) where
type(x) =
⎧⎨
⎩
type1(x) if type1(x) is deﬁned;
type2(x) if type1(x) is undeﬁned and type2(x) is deﬁned;
undeﬁned otherwise.
Deﬁnition 35. Let P and Q be two protocols such that dom(P) = dom(Q), ID(P) ∩ ID(Q) = ∅. If P establishes
c, and d is a parameter in all roles of Q, the chaining composition P · Q of P and Q is deﬁned as:
P · Q def= {r → P(r) · Q(r)[c/d] ∣∣ r ∈ dom(P)},
where Q(r)[c/d] denotes replacing d by c in the role speciﬁcation Q(r).
Note that every event is relabeled after this composition, but there is a natural correspondence between the
labels of P and Q, and the labels of P · Q (excluding the end event of P and create event of Q).
The formalmodel described in Section 2 allows us to deﬁne explicitly the concept of passing information from
one protocol to another. This exactly coincides with the idea of input and output, modeled using parameters.
However, simply passing information does not sufﬁce to preserve synchronization. Intuitively, if agents of the
ﬁrst subprotocol do not all share the value to be passed on to the next subprotocol, amismatch between different
runs of the agents may occur and synchronization may be broken. Likewise, the next subprotocol must ensure
that all agents got passed the same value. In order to ensure this, we use data agreement for the value passed
between subprotocols.
Theorem 36. Let P , Q be protocols such that P establishes c, d is a parameter in all roles of Q and P · Q is deﬁned.
Let  be a set of protocols, P ,Q ∈ . Let {i} be a set of labels for one injective synchronization claim event and
one data agreement claim event with argument c in every role of P , the synchronization claim events appearing after
all read and send events in the role. Let  and ′ be the labels of a data agreement claim event with d as argument
and a synchronization claim event, respectively, in some roleQ such that the claim event labeled  causally precedes
the one labeled ′. Let ′′ be the label of a corresponding injective synchronization claim event in P · Q. Then
sat({P 〈c〉,Q〈c!/d〉} ∪, {i} ∪ {, ′}) ⇒ sat({P · Q} ∪, ′′).
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Proof. Let  ∈ Tr ({P · Q} ∪). We map  to a trace ′ ∈ Tr ({P 〈c〉,Q〈c!/d〉} ∪) as follows: Without loss of
generality we can assume that the set Runid of run identiﬁers is a subset of non-negative integers. Let the highest
occurring run identiﬁer in  be ridB, and suppose we have a run with run identiﬁer rid of a role r of P · Q with
events i1 ,i2 , . . . ,ik . If there is no event in the run corresponding to an event of the protocol Q, we relabel all
of the events to be events of P . Otherwise, let il be the ﬁrst event in the run corresponding to an event of Q.
(1) We relabel i1 , . . . ,il−1 to be events of P , and il , . . . ,ik to be events of Q.
(2) We change the -parts of the instantiations of il , . . . ,ik so that they are only deﬁned at identiﬁers of Q.
(3) We change the run identiﬁer of il , . . . ,ik to rid + ridB + 1.
(4) Weapply to everyother event in the trace the substitution {xrid → xrid+ridB + 1 | x ∈ ID(Q)∧type(x) =
const }, where Q(r) = (elist, type).
(5) We insert a end for P(r) and a create event Q(r) with the proper value for the parameter d just before il
in the trace.
When this operation is performed for every run of a role of P · Q, we get a trace ′ ∈ Tr ({P 〈c〉,Q〈c!/d〉} ∪),
and this gives us a map
 : Tr ({P · Q} ∪) → Tr ({P 〈c〉,Q〈c!/d〉} ∪). (3)
Now consider a run of role r with run identiﬁer ridr where the claim event with label ′′ occurs. First, we
note that because of injective synchronization for P , we have a unique cast cast for P in ′. This translates into
a potential cast cast ′ for Q in ′ given by cast ′(r′) = cast(r)+ ridB + 1, as well as a cast for P · Q in . By data
agreement for c in P , we know that every run in the cast agree on the value of c. Since P does not take any input,
the value of cmust originate with one of the roles, hence it must also be unique among all the runs of P . Further,
by data agreement on d in Q, we know that cast ′ really is a cast for Q in ′, it is unique, that every member of
the cast agrees on the value of d , and that this value is the same as the value of c.
Now we verify the i -synch claim with label ′′ for ridr in  with the unique cast cast . Consider a role r′ and
a label x such that x ∈ P · Q(r) and x ∈ P · Q(r′). We must show that there are two events with this label in
, belonging to the cast, and sending and reading the same message. Because of synchronization in ′, we ﬁnd
matching events belonging to the cast for the corresponding labels in ′. Note that since the map  only changes
instantiations by applying a substitution, if the content of the messages is the same in ′, the same must hold in
. We conclude that the injective synchronization claim with label ′′ is satisﬁed in . 
The following theorem states the conditions under which secrecy is preserved in a sequential protocol com-
position.
Theorem 37.Let P ,Q be protocols such that P establishes c, d is a parameter in all roles ofQ and P · Q is deﬁned.Let
 be a set of protocols, P ,Q ∈ . Let  be the label of a secret claim event in P orQ, and let ′ be the corresponding
label in P · Q. Then
sat({P 〈c〉,Q〈c!/d〉} ∪, ) ⇒ sat({P · Q} ∪, ′).
Proof. We use the map  from (3). Note that instantiations are changed by at most a nonce run term renaming
under thismap, so the intruder’s knowledge is also changed by atmost a nonce run term renaming. The predicate
derived from the secret claim does not change its value under nonce run term renaming, from which the result
follows. 
The same conditions that preserve secrecy, also preserve session-unique and data -agree in a sequential pro-
tocol composition.
Theorem 38. Let P , Q be protocols such that P establishes c, d is a parameter in all roles of Q and P · Q is deﬁned.
Let  be a set of protocols, P ,Q ∈ . Let  be the label of a session-unique or data -agree claim event in P or Q,
and let ′ be the corresponding label in P · Q. Then
sat({P 〈c〉,Q〈c!/d〉} ∪, ) ⇒ sat({P · Q} ∪, ′).
Proof. We use the map  from (3). By the construction of the map, if some value only appears in one claim event
in (), it will only appear in one claim event in  as well. This proves the theorem for session-unique.
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As for data agreement, if events for some cast exist in () with the correct value, they will also exist in .
This proves the theorem for data -agree . 
By deﬁnition of session and wsession , the preceding two theorems give conditions under which these two
properties are preserved. This is expressed in the following
Corollary 39. Let P , Q be protocols such that P establishes c, d is a parameter in all roles of Q and P · Q is deﬁned.
Let be a set of protocols, P ,Q ∈ . Let  be the label of a (weak) session claim event in P or Q, and let ′ be the
corresponding label in P · Q. Then
sat({P 〈c〉,Q〈c!/d〉} ∪, ) ⇒ sat({P · Q} ∪, ′).
Proof. We use Theorem 37 and Theorem 38 to establish that the requisite secret, session-unique and data -agree
claims hold, and the result follows. 
4. Mobile WiMAX
In this section we apply our framework to a handful of protocols from the security sublayer of the IEEE
802.16-2005 amendment [27] of the IEEE 802.16-2004 standard [26], commonly and in the following referred to
as (mobile)WiMAX. The aim is not a complete veriﬁcation ofWiMAX as this would constitute a research topic
of its own. Instead, we use WiMAX to illustrate our framework on a real-world protocol suite and as a measure
for our progress towards the goal of a comprehensive theory of protocol veriﬁcation. We stress that even in the
limited setting we consider, our methods are strong enough to draw useful conclusions about protocol design
and security ﬂaws.
4.1. Introduction
The IEEE 802.16-2004 standard speciﬁes the air interface of ﬁxed broadband wireless access systems sup-
porting multimedia services in local and metropolitan area networks. The 802.16-2005 amendment addresses
mobility of subscriber stations and features new security protocols.
Abrief overviewof the communicationbetweenamobile stationandbase station follows.The communication
starts at the mobile station’s network entry with the Ranging protocol. Its purpose is to set up physical com-
munication parameters and assign a basic connection identiﬁer to the requesting mobile station. This protocol
is periodically executed later to re-communicate the physical communication parameters. Next, a Registration
protocol is carried out in order to allow the mobile station into the network. During this protocol, the base
station and mobile station’s security capabilities are negotiated. The base station and mobile station can agree
on unilateral or mutual authentication, or no authentication at all, and on a variety of key management proto-
cols. The key management protocols are periodically repeated to update the trafﬁc encryption keys. The entire
authentication chain is repeated on a less frequent basis. Once the trafﬁc encryption keys are established, user
data protocols start. To avoid service interruptions, trafﬁc encryption keys have overlapping lifetimes.
The authentication and key management protocols are speciﬁed in the security sublayer of WiMAX. The
security sublayer is meant to provide subscribers with privacy and authentication and operators with strong
protection from theft of service [27, Chapter 7]. It employs an authenticated client/server key management
protocol in which the base station controls distribution of keying material to the mobile station.
The security sublayer consists of two component protocols, an encapsulation protocol for securing packet
data across the network and a key management protocol providing the secure distribution of keying data from
the base station to the mobile station. In the following sections we will focus on the key management protocol.
Through this key management protocol, the base station and mobile station are to synchronize keying data and
the base station is meant to use the protocol to enforce conditional access to network services.
The overall security goals mentioned in the speciﬁcation are “no theft of service” for the operator of the
base station and “conﬁdentiality” for the user of the mobile station. Conﬁdentiality in WiMAX is deﬁned to
be “privacy” and “authenticity” [27, Chapter 7, footnote 6]. The speciﬁcation gives vague ideas for the security
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Table 2
Required security properties for the PKMv2 subprotocols in WiMAX
Protocol Security properties
PKMv2 RSA i-synch, session(pPAK)
PKMv2 SA-TEK i-synch, session(pPAK),wsession(TEK )
PKMv2 Key synch, session(pPAK),wsession(TEK )
properties that the subprotocols have, by calling them for instance authentication protocols or key update
protocols. But for a thorough security analysis, precise security claims need to be made for each subprotocol
and the relation between the security properties achieved by the subprotocols and the overall security goals
needs to be understood. We are addressing these issues in the following section.
4.2. Key management in the Security Sublayer
The privacy key management (PKM) component of the security sublayer consists of authentication and
key establishment protocols. Depending on the negotiated security capabilities, the IEEE-802.16-2004 PKM
protocols or the new PKM version 2 protocols will be executed. In the following security analysis, we consider
the sequence of the three PKM version 2 protocols PKMv2 RSA, PKMv2 SA-TEK, and PKMv2 Key . PKMv2
RSA authenticates the base station (bs) and mobile station (ms) and establishes a shared secret which is used
by PKMv2 SA-TEK and PKMv2 Key to secure the exchange of trafﬁc encryption keys (TEKs). WiMAX does
not explicitly state what the security claims of these three protocols are. As indicated in the Introduction, it is
stated that the sequential composition of the three protocols achieves strong authentication and privacy for the
mobile station, and strongly protects the base station from theft of service. Furthermore, it is implicitly stated
that the established keys are shared secrets and PKMv2 RSA is called a mutual authentication protocol.
We are making these properties more precise by imposing the following requirements on the composition of
the three protocols. In order to provide “strong protection against theft of service” [27, Chapter 7] for the base
station, the client station has to be strongly authenticated at the end of the protocol composition, i.e. the role
of the base station has to satisfy the i -synch claim and all key material must be secret. Note that if the i -synch
claim is true at the end of the protocol composition then we are guaranteed that every message read by bs up to
that point has been sent by ms and exactly matches the message sent by ms. Thus, no theft of service can have
occurred up to that point. In order to provide privacy and authenticity for the subscriber station, we demand
that the base station is strongly authenticated at the end of the protocol composition, and that all session keys
and symmetric encryption keys are secret and unique.
We argue now that the following security properties for the three protocols and their sequential composition
need to be fulﬁlled and prove in the next section that these properties indeed imply our set security goals. Since
PKMv2 RSA needs to authenticate ms and bs and establish a shared secret which is to be used as a key later
on, it has to satisfy i -synch for both roles and session for the shared secret. Since PKMv2 SA-TEK and PKMv2
Key need to establish further keys while keeping up the authentication property between ms and bs, they both
need to satisfy synch for both roles, session for the shared secret, and at least wsession for the trafﬁc encryption
keys.5 This implies in particular that the shared secret and trafﬁc encryption keys have to be secret in all three
protocols. We summarize these requirements in Table 2. It corresponds to the summary of veriﬁed security
properties in Section 4.3.4.
Before we start the description of the protocols, some technical remarks on our WiMAX model are in
order. We will restrict ourselves to non-handover scenarios with unicast communication, leaving out multicast
and broadcast communication, mesh communication, and group security. We further restrict ourselves to one
Security Association as opposed to a list of several security associations offered by the base station. This is
simply for convenience as it implies that there is only one pair of TEK keys instead of several pairs identiﬁed
by SAID’s and managed by parallel sessions of the PKMv2 Key protocol.
5 Since wsession and data-agree imply session, the use of the TEK’s in user data protocols by both roles will automatically imply the session
claim at that point.
448 S. Andova et al. / Information and Computation 206 (2008) 425–459
In our model, we have simpliﬁed messages by omitting irrelevant terms and headers. In particular, the fact
that all messages in WiMAX are formatted using a type/length/value (TLV) scheme, we show only implicitly
by giving appropriate names to identiﬁers. Entries in a TLV list are called attributes. WiMAX speciﬁcation
states that both roles silently discard all messages that do not contain all required attributes and skip over
unknown attributes. Note that the use of TLVs together with signatures and hashed message authentication
codes in WiMAX also implies that we may disregard type ﬂaw attacks. Finally, we model hash functions as
encryptions with a special public key, known by all parties, whose inverse key is not known by anyone. We
thus write {|m |}h(salt) for the message m to which a message authentication code has been attached. Private key
signatures will be indicated by {|m |}
sk(ms) and {|m |}sk(bs).
4.2.1. PKMv2 RSA
The PKMv2 RSA protocol (Fig. 4) is the initial mutual authentication protocol. It is repeated periodically
to update the pPAK. Its purpose is to establish a shared secret pPAK (called pre-PAK in WiMAX) between
ms and bs . The shared secret is used to derive the authentication key from which the keys for hashed message
authentication codes and symmetric encryptions are derived.
According to speciﬁcation, the Request message consists of MS-Rnd, MS-Crt, SAIDand a signature over a
SHA-1 hash of these ﬁelds using ms’s secret key, whose corresponding public key bs learns from MS-Crt. We
model this by sending MS-Crt outside of {|. . . |}
sk(ms). The same applies to BS-Crt in the Reply and Reject mes-
sages.
4.2.2. PKMv2 SA-TEK
The PKMv2 SA-TEK protocol (Fig. 5) is a three-way handshake protocol which follows the PKMv2 RSA
protocol. Its purpose is to update the trafﬁc encryption keys if they already exist. The protocol’s messages
are authenticated by hashing them with keys derived from pPAK established by the PKMv2 RSA protocol.
Different keys are used for uplink and downlink trafﬁc. The base station sends a challenge to the mobile station,
which the mobile station repeats in its request for updated key material and thus proves liveness and knowledge
of the shared secret (by using the derived HMAC key) to the base station. The base station answers then with
updated key material, repeating the mobile station’s nonce.
4.2.3. PKMv2 Key
The PKMv2 Key protocol (Fig. 6) allows the mobile station to obtain the most recent TEK key from the
base station.
4.3. Applying the framework
Webegin by analyzing the three protocols described in the previous section in isolation and thenwe apply our
theorems to their sequential composition. To facilitate later exposition, we will, during the course of the analysis,
simplify the protocols presented above. Since the aim of this work is not a careful and formal analysis of these
short subprotocols, we will reason on an informal level for clarity, backed up by the automated veriﬁcation tool
Scyther. After that, we will analyze the composition in detail.
4.3.1. Analysis of PKMv2 RSA
We analyze the PKMv2 RSA protocol without the Auth Info message which according to speciﬁcation is
only being sent right after Ranging and never again. We ﬁrst consider i -synch for ms and bs and then the session
property for pPAK.
4.3.1.1. i -synch . Since we have a choice in the third message between Replyand Reject, we will ﬁrst analyze the
branch with Reply, then the branch with Reject.
Reply. Note that the structure of Request , Reply, Acknowledgment is similar to the standard X.509 protocol,
except for the last message where the identity of bs is missing. As a consequence, it suffers from a man-
in-the-middle attack causing bs to not synchronize. The intruder executes the man-in-the-middle attack by
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Fig. 4. The PKMv2 RSA protocol.
taking advantage of an ms trying to connect to the intruder and redirecting those messages to a bs. In [43]
the authors describe a similar, but slightly more complicated attack, in which the intruder uses two runs of
ms to impersonate ms to bs. Both attacks can be found using Scyther.
The attacker cannot, however, impersonate bs to ms, and the ms role in fact still synchronizes and the
pPAK remains secret. It is also interesting to note that Request , Reply, Acknowledgment followed by PKMv2
SA-TEK has agreement (an authentication property slightly weaker than synchronization, see [16]) for both
ms and bs. However, we still consider the lack of bs’s identity in Acknowledgment a design ﬂaw, since it is
supposed to be a “mutual authentication” protocol according to speciﬁcation and hence, in its current form,
breaks a modular design principle: small changes in other protocols (for instance PKMv2 SA-TEK ) could
break the security of the entire composition.
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Fig. 5. The PKMv2SA-TEK protocol.
For future reference, we write P to denote the protocol consisting of Request , Reply, and Acknowledgment ’
where Acknowledgment ’ is the message {|BS-Rnd, bs |}
sk(ms) from ms to bs. Furthermore, we will denote the
pPAK in P simply by c. P has injective synchronization for both roles.
Reject. As in the branch analyzed above, the structure Request , Reject, Acknowledgment resembles the X.509
standard. Here however, both Reject and Acknowledgment are missing the recipient’s ID. Therefore, neither
bs nor ms synchronize (the weaker agreement notion is not satisﬁed either). A pPAK is not being sent, thus
the secrecy claim is void. The fact that ms does not synchronize can be abused for a denial of service attack.
We amend the ﬂaws pointed out above by considering P instead ofPKMv2-RSA . Note the absence of aReject
message from P . A Reject message sent from bs to ms terminates the protocol. In order for ms to communicate
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Fig. 6. The PKMv2 Key protocol.
with bs it has to start over with the Ranging protocol. For this reason, we will simplify the analysis of the
composition in Section 4.3.4, without affecting any of the security properties we are interested in, if we consider
the protocol without the Reject message; instead of a send event corresponding to the Reject message, the run
of the bs role ends.
The speciﬁcation of protocol P is given below. For brevity, we omit the typing of identiﬁers and use the
shorthand for the message contents as displayed in Fig. 4. The descriptive labels of the claim events are inserted
for further reference.
P(ms) = createP 1(ms) · sendP2(ms, bs ,Request) · readP3(bs ,ms,Reply)·
sendP4
(
ms, bs , {|BS-Rnd, bs |}
sk(ms)
)
· claim
i-synch(P ,ms)(ms, i -synch )·
claim
session(P ,ms,c)(ms, session , c) · endP5(ms)
P(bs) = createP6(bs) · readP2(ms, bs ,Request) · sendP3(bs ,ms,Reply)·
readP4
(
ms, bs , {|BS-Rnd, bs |}
sk(ms)
)
· claimi-synch(P ,bs)(bs , i -synch )·
claimsession(P ,bs,c)(bs , session , c) · endP7(bs)
In the remainder, we will use the abbreviation i -synch (P) to stand for the combination of i -synch (P ,ms) and
i -synch (P , bs). We will use similar abbreviations for the other claims and protocols.
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Using Scyther, we prove synchronization. Given the fact that P satisﬁes the loop-property from [16], we
establish
sat({P }, {i -synch (P)}).
4.3.1.2. session . We use Scyther to verify that pPAK is secret. The data -agree property is satisﬁed because of
injective synchronization, and the fact that pPAK is part of a message causally preceding the synchronization
claims. Finally, session-unique is also satisﬁed because of injective synchronization and the fact that pPAK is a
constant in one of the roles appearing only in one send event, accompanied, within a signature, by the recipient’s
nonce.
The established result is
sat({P }, {session (P , c)}).
4.3.2. Analysis of PKMv2 SA-TEK
We call Q the protocol obtained from PKMv2 SA-TEK by introducing the parameter d , which will obtain its
value from the constant c produced by protocol P . The parameter d will hold the shared secret established in P
from which the HMAC and KEK keys are derived. Furthermore, the collection of TEK keys will be denoted by
e in Q. Thus, Q is up to renaming of constants equivalent to PKMv2SA -TEK .
We insert session claim events for d , weak session claim events for e, and injective synchronization at the endof
both roles, with labels session (Q,ms, d), session (Q, bs , d), wsession (Q,ms, e), wsession (Q, bs , e), i -synch (Q,ms),
and i -synch (Q, bs). This yields the following description of protocolQ (assuming h1, h2, and h3 are distinct hash
functions).
Q(ms) = createQ1(ms) · readQ2(bs ,ms, {|BS-Rnd ′,AKID′ |}h1(d))·
sendQ3(ms, bs , {|MS-Rnd ′,BS-Rnd ′,AKID |}h2(d))·
readQ4(bs ,ms, {|MS-Rnd ′,BS-Rnd′,AKID, {|e |}h3(d) |}h1(d))·
claim
i-synch(Q,ms)(ms, i -synch ) · claimsession(Q,ms,d)(ms, session , d)·
claim
wsession(Q,ms,e)(ms,wsession , e) · endQ5(ms)
Q(bs) = createQ6(bs) · sendQ2(bs ,ms, {|BS-Rnd ′,AKID′ |}h1(d))·
readQ3(ms, bs , {|MS-Rnd ′,BS-Rnd ′,AKID |}h2(d))·
sendQ4(bs ,ms, {|MS-Rnd ′,BS-Rnd ′,AKID, {|e |}h3(d) |}h1(d))·
claimi-synch(Q,bs)(bs , i -synch ) · claimsession(Q,bs,d)(bs, session, d)·
claimwsession(Q,bs,e)(bs,wsession , e) · endQ7(bs)
Again, we verify injective synchronization and secrecy for d and e using Scyther. Note that the veriﬁcation
has to be done for the trace restrictionQ〈session/d〉. Session trace restrictions can be simulated in Scyther using
technical tricks, but are expected to be supported natively in the future.
The session-unique property follows from arguments analogous to the ones shown for c in P and the session
trace restriction for both d and e. Data agreement for d follows from injective synchronization and the appear-
ance of d in a message causally preceding the i -synch claim for both roles. For e we do not get data agreement
for the bs role, since e is sent in the last message for which bs has no guarantee that ms received it.
We have shown
sat({Q〈session/d〉}, {session (Q, d),wsession (Q, e), i -synch (Q)})
4.3.3. Analysis of PKMv2 Key
Similarly to the previous two protocols, we will let R denote the protocol obtained from PKMv2 Key by
denoting the HMAC keys by d , the old TEK keys by e and the new TEK keys by e′. We let R only consist of
the Request and Reply messages, since the alternative has exactly the same security properties.
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We have i -synch for the ms role, shown by applying Scyther and using the loop property, but only synch for
bs .
The session property for d and wsession property for e′ can be shown in exactly the same manner as for the
Q protocol.
R(ms) = createR1(ms) · sendR2(ms, bs , {|n |}h2(d))·
readR3(bs ,ms, {|{|e′ |}h3(d), n |}h1(d))·
claim
i-synch(R,ms)(ms, i -synch ) · claimsession(R,ms,d)(ms, session , d)·
claim
wsession(R,ms,e′)(ms,wsession , e
′) · endR5(ms)
R(bs) = createR6(bs) · readR2(ms, bs , {|n |}h2(d))·
sendR3(bs ,ms, {|{|e′ |}h3(d), n |}h1(d))·
claimsynch(R,bs)(bs , synch ) · claimsession(R,bs,d)(bs , session , d)·
claimwsession(R,bs,e′)(bs ,wsession , e
′) · endR7(bs)
Abbreviating the claim labels, we obtain
sat({R〈session/d〉}, {i -synch (R,ms), synch (R, bs), session (R, d),wsession (R, e′)}).
4.3.4. The composition
In the preceding three subsections we have established that
sat({P }, {i -synch (P), session (P , c)}) (4)
sat({Q〈session/d〉}, {session (Q, d),wsession (Q, e), i -synch (Q)}) (5)
sat({R〈session/d〉}, {i -synch (R,ms), synch (R, bs), (6)
session (R, d),wsession (R, e′)})
The methodology for the veriﬁcation of these facts is standard. In what follows, we apply the collection of
theorems in our framework to show how the established properties imply correctness of the composed protocol
P · Q · R.
Note that P , Q, and R are mutually strongly independent since the messages, as stated in Section 4.2, are
TLV encoded, the signatures or hashed message authentication codes are made over the entire message, and the
message structures are different in the three protocols. More precisely, protocol P is independent from Q and R
because all messages in P are signed by private keys and hence the signatures will not be accepted by either role
in protocols Q and R, their messages being authenticated using the shared secret keys. Protocols Q and R are
strongly independent, since they do not have a message in common in which all required attributes are identical.
Using strong independence, we can now deduce that P followed by Q satisﬁes injective synchronization,
session, and weak session as follows.
By Theorem 32 and Eqs. (4) and (5), we can preserve the i -synch property for P , Q. By Corollary 33, c and d
keep the session property, and e the wsession property.
Therefore, we obtain
sat({P 〈c〉,Q〈c/d〉}, {i -synch (P), i -synch (Q), session (P , c), session (Q, d),wsession (Q, e)}),
and using Theorems 36 (to obtain i -synch ), and Corollary 39 (wsession and session ) we get
sat({P · Q}, {i -synch (PQ), session (PQ, c),wsession (PQ, e)}). (7)
Here we assume that in the composed protocol P · Q roles bs andms are extended with appropriate claim events.
We use the three labels i -synch (PQ), session (PQ, c), and wsession (PQ, e) to refer to these claims.
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Next, by Theorem 32 we establish from (6) and (7) injective synchronization for both roles and by
Corollary 33 session for c and wsession for e:
sat({P · Q〈c〉,R〈c/d〉}, {i -synch (PQ), session (PQ, c),wsession (PQ, e), i -synch (R,ms), synch (R, bs),
session (R, d),wsession (R, e′)})
Using Theorem 36 andCorollary 39 onemore time, we can show that the entire composition satisﬁes injective
synchronization and (weak) session secrecy for the shared secret c and the trafﬁc encryption key e:
sat(P · Q · R, {i -synch (PQR), session (PQR, c),wsession (PQR, e),wsession (PQR, e′)})
These are exactly the overall security properties we have formulated in Section 4.2. As we have shown in
that section, these security properties are a precise interpretation of the security goals stated in the WiMAX
speciﬁcation.
4.4. WiMAX: conclusion and related work
We have veriﬁed that the sequential composition of the key management protocols PKMv2 RSA, PKMv2
SA-TEK, and PKMv2 Key satisﬁes strong authentication and session secrecy for keys derived from the shared
secret and for trafﬁc encryption keys. However, in order to achieve this veriﬁcation, we had to ﬁrst formulate
precise security properties for the subprotocols and their composition, based on our interpretation of the rather
vague security goals speciﬁed in WiMAX.
While we have shown that our strong authentication property i -synch holds for the protocol composition
as stated, it has to be noted that a composition consisting of repeated iterations of the PKMv2 Key protocol
would fail to satisfy this property, due to replay attacks. In practice, such attacks would only be a nuisance, not
a security threat, since secret would still hold true for all keys, and such an active intruder would not be able to
learn anything more than a passive, listening, one. Thus, in future work, the WiMAX protocols will be analyzed
with an appropriately weakened notion of authentication.
Although several studies onWiMAX security have appeared, none of these offer a precise and compositional
veriﬁcation of the WiMAX key management protocols. Closest to our work is a preliminary study in [30], which
sketches the steps towards a compositional veriﬁcation. An analysis of some protocols from the 2001 version of
the WiMAX standard is conducted in [28]. Their main observation is that the old protocols achieve unilateral
authentication, while mutual authentication of bs and ms is required. The proposed ﬁxes clearly found their
way into the current standard. However, the protocols are studied in isolation and the authors did not apply
formal reasoning to prove the ﬁxed protocols correct. Xu et al. [43,44] analyzed several isolated protocols from
the current WiMAX standard. Through informal reasoning, they discovered the attack mentioned in Section
4.3.1 and proposed a ﬁx. The modiﬁed protocol is proved correct by using the BAN-logic [9], which is known to
be incomplete with respect to insider attacks. Finally, we mention an analysis of the current WiMAX standard
using the TLA+ logic in [44]. The authors study the composition of the three mentioned key management
protocols as one single protocol. Exploiting symmetry reduction techniques, they manage to apply the TLC
model checker to verify the composed protocol. However, their focus is not on the key management properties
that we investigate (such as authentication and secrecy), but on detecting a class of denial-of-service attacks. In
order to validate liveness, they focus on the state machines underlying the protocols.
5. Related work
In this section we address work related to the composition of security protocols. We discuss strand spaces,
as well as the more recent Protocol Composition Logic, in some detail below. Afterwards we address related
theoretical results, and discuss some attempts at the veriﬁcation of composed protocols.
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5.1. Strand spaces
Within a modiﬁed version of the Strand Spaces framework [41], called the Mixed Strand Spaces model
[42], some results about compositionality have been proven. In [22], a disjoint encryption theorem is proven.
This theorem states that if two protocols have sufﬁciently different encrypted messages (at the trace/run level),
composing them in parallel will not introduce new attacks. In terms of methodology, this work is closely related
to ours: given any two correct protocols, what abstract properties should they satisfy, in order to ensure that
their composition is correct?
The main differences between their approach and ours, are that (1) they only consider parallel composition,
and (2) veriﬁcation of the disjoint encryption property has to be done at the level of traces. With respect to
the ﬁrst item, we note that the approach does not allow for the decomposition of large sequential protocols
into smaller ones, as can be done with the chaining theorems presented here. Similarly, there are no concepts
such as session-secrecy. Consequently, the disjoint encryption approach cannot be used for the compositional
veriﬁcation of strongly dependent subprotocols such as those present in WiMAX, for instance.
The second item represents a more signiﬁcant drawback of the approach. The veriﬁcation of disjoint encryp-
tion has to be performed at the trace level of the composed protocols. For some protocols, this can be easily,
but nevertheless manually, deduced from the protocol speciﬁcation, but in many other cases (e.g. where session
keys are used in protocols) the only way to verify that the disjoint encryption property holds is by inspecting
the traces of the composed protocol. Therefore, in such cases there is no expected improvement on the more
traditional approach of, for example, model checking all traces of the composed protocol.
As a more subtle drawback, the proof given for the disjoint encryption theorem assumes that the security
properties do not include ordering constraints. Thus, it is not immediately possible to apply the theorem for the
veriﬁcation of strong authentication properties, such as e.g. the synchronization property.
One advantage of the approach is that their results also hold for protocols that include tickets, something
that we have explicitly excluded here.
5.2. Protocol Composition Logic
One of the most signiﬁcant theoretical results in the work on Protocol Composition Logic (PCL) [17] is a
strategy for dealing with protocol composition. The basic idea is to prove the protocols correct in isolation by
constructing a correctness proof in the logic. Certain so-called invariants are then identiﬁed in the correctness
proofs, such that protocol correctness follows from these invariants only. If these invariants are not violated by
the other protocols, it is an easy consequence that correctness is retained under composition, since correctness
follows from the invariants alone.
In contrast to this very general strategy, our composition theorems identify speciﬁc classes of protocols that
can be composed in certainways. The advantage of our approach is that it is highly amenable to automatic veriﬁ-
cation (as demonstrated in Section 4), especially when combinedwith the trivially veriﬁable strong independence
property. In contrast, the full generality of proof derivation in PCL seems difﬁcult to automate.
It is easy to see that our notion of strong independence is a stronger requirement than the invariants used for
composition in PCL. Nevertheless, strong independence is trivial to verify, hence highly suited for an automatic
veriﬁcation strategy. It is possible that composition theorems similar to ours, based on strong independence,
could be recovered in the PCL framework.
The PCL invariant approach can deal with cases that our notion of independence cannot. The reason
for this is that independence only considers ciphertext terms and their origins, while PCL invariants cover
more general statements. Conversely, since independence is veriﬁed for traces while PCL invariants are veri-
ﬁed over so-called basic sequences, it is not immediately obvious that the PCL approach can deal with every
case our independence notion can deal with. Investigating this relationship is an interesting topic for future
research.
We believe that many ideas and techniques used in PCL can be reused in our framework. The techniques used
to identify and verify invariants could possibly be used to prove independence. Due to the highly manual nature
of the PCL compositionality strategy, we expect any such work to be complementary to the theory developed
in this paper, to be used only when automatic techniques fail.
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An alternative approach is taken in the PDa tool [3]. In this tool, an axiomatic theory is set up to reason
about protocol reﬁnement and composition. The tool uses ideas from PCL to reason about invariants. The
tool can provide automatic discharging of simple proofs. However, the user has to provide sufﬁciently strength-
ened invariants to allow for compositional proofs. The axiomatic theory does not have a notion of run (or
process or thread), similar to e.g. BAN logic, and as a result only very weak notions of authentication can be
considered.
5.3. Related theoretical results
The complex problem of compositionality has been approached from a variety of angles. Many of these
approaches are restricted to weak forms of authentication, such as [7,8,33]. When only such weaker forms are
considered, compositionality results can be achieved on the basis of simpler challenge-response mechanisms
within a protocol, similar to the authentication tests from [23]. The existence of these mechanisms in a protocol
does not ensure synchronization, or even agreement.
Other approaches have considered secrecy, e.g. [29]. Here a notion of secrecy is deﬁned within the context of
stream-processing functions. Using the notion of an m-secrecy protecting process, a result is given that states
that two such processes can be safely composed. Furthermore, it is shown that such a process remains secrecy-
protecting under reﬁnement. Similar to the Strand Spaces approach, it is unclear how one can establish that a
process (or protocol) satisﬁes the required conditions for the stated theorems.
In the area of information ﬂow analysis, which is related to the secrecy-only approach, there are a number of
results and supporting tools, e.g. [20,21,25,29,34].However, because of fundamental differences in the underlying
models, these results cannot be used for the compositional analysis of security protocols such as WiMAX.
In [10] the observation is made that the correctness of security protocols depends on the assumptions on the
environment. In the wrong environment, or in the context of speciﬁc protocols, seemingly secure protocols are
incorrect. The authors give no speciﬁc conditions or properties.
Over the past decades compositional veriﬁcation has received quite some attention from the process algebra
community and was applied successfully in the veriﬁcation of complex concurrent systems (for an overview
of these techniques, see e.g. [39]). However, these techniques do not seem to carry over easily to the process
algebras developed especially for security protocols, such as the spi calculus [1]. An attempt has been made in
[6]. Here, compositionality is interpreted as a congruence property of a bisimulation-like relation over several
process operators. Although the authors provide compositional rules for (restricted) parallel and action-preﬁx
composition, rules for general sequential composition are absent, making it impossible to apply this work to
e.g. the WiMAX protocol suite. Moreover, the rule for parallel composition poses a very strong restriction on
the set of processes that may run in parallel with any given process.
Furthermore, the security properties treated are secrecy and weak forms of authentication. It is not obvious
how general protocol-centric properties and especially injectivity can be expressed by means of the bisimulation
relation provided. Finally, we note that the proposed methodology has severe limitations with respect to the
veriﬁcation of actual protocols. As an example, the authors prove correctness of a version of the Wide Mouthed
Frog protocol, which is obviously insecure in the standard setting for security protocols. This problem is due to
the fact that their theory only supports the veriﬁcation of ﬁxed scenarios.
5.4. Veriﬁcation of composed security protocols
In the area of protocol veriﬁcation, it seems that the ﬁrst attempt at veriﬁcation of parallel subprotocols was
made in [35], where the interaction between subprotocols was investigated manually.
An attempt at composing security protocol proofs within a theorem-proving environment was made in [40].
In this work, the authors construct compositional proofs for a speciﬁc protocol, in order to work towards a
general theory. The conclusion of the authors is that even for a single protocol, the approach requires much
manual work, and that scaling problems might cause this approach to be infeasible.
More recently fully automated veriﬁcation of composed protocols was performed in [13] employing the same
basic framework and tool used here. However, this veriﬁcation, too, has been limited to protocols that are
composed in parallel.
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6. Conclusion
We make two signiﬁcant contributions in this paper. First, we create a framework for easy veriﬁcation of
a large and useful class of security protocols built from smaller subprotocols. Second, we initiate a study of
WiMAX, by applying our framework to the composition of three protocols from its security sublayer. This is
done by ﬁrst verifying that the three protocols are independent and then analyzing each subprotocol in isolation.
The results of this analysis are used to deduce properties about the composition of the subprotocols, consisting
of the subprotocols running in parallel with suitable transfer of information. Consequently, this allows us to
derive properties of the composed protocol.
We do not claim that our framework can deal with every possible security protocol. One important restriction
is the requirement in many theorems that subprotocols are independent. This makes it difﬁcult to use our
framework for analysis of protocols that do not naturally split into independent subprotocols. As we have
argued, protocol tags are a reasonably cost-effective way to design protocols that are amenable to analysis in
our framework. WiMAX is just one example of protocols in which such techniques are in use today. We believe
this is a very reasonable approach to future protocol design.
A signiﬁcant advantage of our framework is ease of use. If we consider the WiMAX analysis, the Scyther
tool automatically proves secrecy and synchronization for the subprotocols. Since session-uniqueness and data
agreement claims have not yet been implemented in Scyther, a small amount of reasoning is needed to prove
that the protocols have these properties in isolation. Once the properties are established, however, using the
theorems to deduce the security properties of the composed protocol is essentially trivial. As the WiMAX
analysis to some degree shows, it should be possible to verify protocols without an intimate knowledge of the
underlying semantics described in Section 2, since a tool like Scyther (once it is suitably extended) can deal with
the proofs needed at this level.
An interesting feature of our framework is that the theorem statements are not strongly connected to the un-
derlying semantics. They are therefore in a sense independent of the semantics. Indeed, we believe the framework
could be transferred to any other semantics powerful enough to express at least the notion of independence and
the security properties, and which has a similar execution model.
In general, our theorems are tight in the sense that if any precondition is relaxed, the theorem is no longer
true. Of course, some theorems could be extended in natural ways, and other theorems have many specialized
variations. For the current work, we believe such extensions would add little value. Instead, such results should
be proved as needed, slowly increasing the knowledge about how composition works.
In this work, we have deﬁned the protocol-centric class of security properties and proved many theorems
for that class. Likewise, we can deﬁne other classes of properties, for instance properties that only consider the
intruder’s memory. Studying such classes of properties and proving theorems about them is an interesting future
topic.
Another useful contribution in this paper is our deﬁnition of protocol independence. Currently, we have
only described one way to achieve independence, namely protocol tags. There are several other ways one could
imagine achieving independence, for instance through some notion of separate key infrastructures. One can also
imagine other notions of independence that allow general theorems to be proved. Such notions would create new
protocol design strategies and allowmore protocols to be analyzed.We intend to continue ourwork on this topic.
The requirement in our semantics that variables only contain nonce run terms prevents us from expressing
protocols using tickets in the semantics. The requirement is only essential for Theorem 26. A more signiﬁcant
problem is the fact that security properties such as synchronization or agreement do not make sense in the
context of tickets, since some roles are by deﬁnition insensitive to the content of the tickets. An important topic
for future work will be to extend our framework with new security properties and new theorems for ticket-based
security protocols.
In our framework we discuss how to compose protocols. While sequential composition is the natural notion
of protocol composition, there are other possible composition operators that are natural to discuss, such as the
choice operator allowing one out of two protocols to run. Extending our framework with such operators and
theorems to support reasoning with them is an important future topic.
As we have already noted, the Scyther tool does not have support for every security property we have deﬁned,
nor for every trace restriction. In the near future, we intend to extend Scyther with support for these security
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properties and trace restrictions. A related task is the creation of a new tool to formally verify reasoning in our
framework. Essentially, this tool will use Scyther as a back-end to analyze the subprotocols, then it will verify
that every theorem application is valid. This will allow automated veriﬁcation of large protocols. As the body
of theorems in our framework increases, so will the power of the tool when the theorems are added.
We have analyzed the security requirements of WiMAX and shown that a somewhat restricted variant of
the protocol satisﬁes these requirements, all by reasoning in our framework and analyzing small subprotocols
in isolation. We believe our study, though not complete, is a useful ﬁrst step towards a complete analysis of the
security requirements of WiMAX, as well as towards a veriﬁcation of the entire protocol suite. In the future, we
intend to work out a complete analysis of the security sublayer of WiMAX.
Today, most new protocols are not veriﬁed (in any sense of the word) when they are released, for example, as
standards. We believe this is because today, veriﬁcation of any sizable protocol is the exclusive province of the
few skilled specialists and researchers working in the area. An important goal of current research is to remedy
this problem. As the analysis of the WiMAX protocols show, our work is a signiﬁcant ﬁrst step towards a
framework for security protocol analysis (with tool support) that could be used by engineers to verify protocols
during design, allowing a proper security analysis of the protocol before release.
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